Strict Liability to the Consumer in California by Prosser, William L.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 3
1-1966
Strict Liability to the Consumer in California
William L. Prosser
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
William L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 Hastings L.J. 9 (1966).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol18/iss1/3
Strict Liability to the Consumer
in California
By WLmLIA L. Pnossima
THE problem of the liability of the seller of a product to the ultimate
user first entered California in 1896, with the case of Lewis v. Terry.'
The upright end of a folding bed manufactured by the defendant fell
in upon the plaintiff as she was about to retire for the night, and broke
her arm. At that time there was a well established general rule, mis-
takenly2 derived from the old English case of Winterbottom v. Wright,8
that the seller of any chattel was not liable to the consumer even for
negligence, unless there was privity of contract between them. To this
rule, over half a century, two more or less generally recognized excep-
tions had developed in other jurisdictions. One was that if the seller
knew that the chattel was dangerous, and failed to disclose it, he be-
came liable in tort for "something like fraud" upon the consumer. 4 The
other was that if the chattel fell into a vaguely undefined category of
"inherently" or "imminently" dangerous articles, which at least in-
cluded drugs, food and drink, explosives and firearms, a tort duty
arose toward the ultimate user to exercise reasonable care to protect
him. In the Lewis case the first of these exceptions was sufficiently
pleaded in the complaint, and the court approved and adopted it in
reversing an order sustaining a demurrer. Subsequent cases agreed.'
This was the progenitor of all of the law on liability to the consumer
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1 I Cal. 39, 43 Pae. 398 (1896).
2One of the important contr ibutions of the late Professor Francis H. Bohlen was
the laying of this ghost in Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of
Tort, 44 Am. L. REG. (N.S.) 209, 280-85, 289-310 (1905). See also Lord Atkin, in
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 588-89.
3 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
4 The earliest case, Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex.
1837), affirmed in 4 M. & W. 337, 150 Eng. Rep. 1458 (Ex. 1838), involved express
misrepresentation as to the safety of a gun, and liability was rested on deceit. Later
decisions, such as Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892),
and Huset v. J. L Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903), found
negligence in non-disclosure.
5 Baker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1936); see Cliff v.
California Spray Chem. Co., 83 Cal. App. 424, 257 Pae. 99 (1927); and cf. Tingey v.
E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947); Call v. Union Ice Co.,
108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal.
App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
in California. The second exception, as to "inherent" or "imminent"
danger, received acceptance in 1916,6 and a third, as to violation of a
safety statute or regulation, was added at a considerably later date."
But until well after 1930, it remained the definite California rule that
unless the case could be brought within one of the exceptions, there
was no liability without privity even for negligence."
In 1916 there came in New York the historic decision in MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co.,9 in which Cardozo enlarged the "inherent
danger" exception to swallow up the general rule. If, he said, the na-
ture of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger, and the
manufacturer is under a duty of reasonable care to make it safe. The
effect of this, with later decisions, was to expand the class of goods
as to which the duty was owed to include all products. Over a period
of some forty years the case swept the country, and it is no longer
seriously challenged anywhere."' California, however, was not one of
the early jurisdictions to follow it. Acceptance was foreshadowed in
1932,"- but the first case to declare definite approval of the new rule
was Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co. 2 in 1934, where a workman
was injured by the collapse of a defective rung of a ladder. Later cases13
in this state have put it beyond dispute that all sellers of all chattels
are subject to negligence liability, to all those who may foreseeably be
expected to suffer injury if the goods are dangerously defective.
The rule of strict liability, without privity and without negligence,
began in other jurisdictions with cases of defective food and drink."4
It came as the aftermath of a prolonged and violent national agitation
6 See Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 Pac. 29 (1916).
7 Quirici v. Freeman, 98 Cal. App. 2d 194, 219 P.2d 897 (1950); Di Muro v.
Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 784, 14 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1961).
8 Cliff v. California Spray Chem. Co., 83 Cal. App. 424, 257 Pac. 99 (1927); see
Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 Pac. 29 (1916).
9217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10 Indiana, about which there was really little doubt, falls definitely into line with
J. I. Case Co. v. Sandefur, 245 Ind. 213, 197 N.E.2d 519 (1964). Mississippi, appar-
ently the last state to hold out, overthrew the requirement of privity in State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), and in the process went all the way
to strict liability in tort.
11In Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932).
12 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1934). The vacated opinion of the District Court
of Appeal is in 22 P.2d 727 (Cal. App. 1933). The first opinion of the supreme court
is in 28 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1934). This was withdrawn in favor of a reversal for error in
instructions.
13 See text accompanying notes 97-101 infra.
14 The history is traced in brief outline in Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel,
69 YATE L.J. 1099, 1103-10 (1960).
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over defective food,:' and the first decisions1 followed immediately
upon the heels of the political overturn of 1912. There was considera-
ble historical support for the idea that the seller of food incurred a
more or less undefined special responsibility to the immediate pur-
chaser, which nineteenth-century cases had called a special implied
warranty.17 In extending this special responsibility to the consumer
who was not in privity, the courts initially were a great deal more clear
as to the result to be achieved than as to any theory which would sup-
port it; and for another fourteen years there was resort to a remarkable
variety of highly ingenious, and equally unconvincing, notions of fic-
titious agencies, third-party beneficiary contract, and the like, plucked
out of thin air as devices to get around the fact that there was no con-
tract between the plaintiff and the defendant.' Finally, in 1927 the
Mississippi court came up with the idea of a "warranty" running with
the goods from the manufacturer to the consumer, by analogy to a
contract running with the land. For more than thirty years after that
date, until Justice Traynor upset the apple cart in 1963, the strict
liability continued to be identified with warranty, which was neces-
sarily a warranty without a contract.
This was attended by numerous difficulties. "Warranty" had be-
come so closely identified with contract in the minds of nearly all
courts and lawyers that contract rules were assumed necessarily to
apply to it. Traditionally it required that the plaintiff should act in
reliance upon some express or implied representation or assurance, or
some promise or undertaking, given him by the defendant; and this
was quite often impossible to make out when the consumer did not
even know the name of the maker. Warranties on the sale of goods
were governed in most states by the Uniform Sales Act, which had
been drawn in 1906 when there was no such thing as a warranty to a
third person; and a good deal of its language spoke exclusively in terms
of the immediate parties to the sale, with a specific provision that there
15 Narrated in Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drug Legislation, 1 LAw
& CONraMP. PRaOB. 3 (1933).
16 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913); Parks v. C. C.
Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914).
17See Dic= soN, PoDocrs LmnxurrY AND man FOOD CONSUMM 26 (1951);
MELcIC, SATE OF FooD Asm Dnrm 10 (1936); Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source
of Liability, 5 IowA L. BuL.L. 6 (1919).
18 Cillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. Rltv. 119, 153-55 (1957),
has collected no less than twenty-nine such devices, which in the aggregate present a
truly fascinating picture of judges determined to arrive at a destination over any avail-
able route, no matter how impassable.
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were no implied warranties of quality except as set forth in the Act.
The buyer was required to give notice to the seller of the breach of
warranty within a reasonable time after he knew or ought to have
known of it. Furthermore, any liability founded upon a warranty was
subject to disclaimer in advance by the seller. There were other minor
obstacles, no longer worthy of mention.19 Altogether the non-contrac-
tual "warranty" in the food cases proved to be ill-adapted to the pur-
pose, and called for a great deal of judicial ingenuity. This, however,
did not prevent the gradual spread of the food rule, until by 1960 it
had been accepted by a clear majority of the courts that had considered
the question.20 What became reasonably clear in the process was that
the "warranty" was not the one made on the original sale, and did not
run with the goods, but was a new and independent one made directly
to the consumer;2' that it did not arise out of or depend upon any
contract, but was imposed by law, in tort, as a matter of policy;2 and
that it was subject to rules of its own.
Although there were two earlier decisions23 in which the end was
accomplished virtually without discussion, the California court first
came to grips with the warranty of food to the consumer in Klein v.
Duchess Sandwich Co.24 in 1939. A ham and cheese sandwich, manu-
19 For iffler discussion, see Prosser, supra note 14, at 1124-34.
20 These courts are listed in Presser, supra note 14, at 1106-10.
21 See Madourous v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S.W.2d 445 (1936); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Le Blanc
v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Markovich
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958); Worley v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); B. F. Good-
rich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
22 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Griggs
Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942); La Hue v. Coca Cola
Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc.,
176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954); Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz.
163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74
N.E.2d 162 (1947).
Compare, in California: Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266
P.2d 163 (1954) (tort statute of limitations applied); Gosling v. Nichols, 59 Cal. App.
2d 442, 139 P.2d 86 (1943) (tort rule as to survival); Singley v. Bigelow, 108 Cal.
App. 436, 291 Pac. 899 (1930) (same); Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d
245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955) (warranty sounds in tort for insurance purposes).
2 3 In Binion v. Sasaki, 5 Cal. App. 2d 15, 41 P.2d 585 (1935), the wife of the
ultimate purchaser was denied recovery on a warranty. But in Gindraux v. Maurice
Mercantile Co., 4 Cal. 2d 206, 47 P.2d 708 (1935), recovery was allowed in a similar
case without discussion. And in Jensen v. Berris, 31 Cal. App. 2d 537, 88 P.2d 220
(1939), one of a party in a resturant who did not himself buy the food was allowed to
recover, with a refusal to discriminate between members of the group.
24 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
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factured by the defendant, proved to be full of maggots. It was sold
by an establishment inappropriately named the Happy Daze Buffet
to a purchaser, who gave it to his wife. She swallowed a bite of it, dis-
covered the source of the peculiar taste, and was understandably made
quite ill. Justice Houser would have been quite willing to find an
agency to buy for her, or even a third-party beneficiary contract;25 but
he preferred, in the light of the food cases in other states, to construe
away the language of the Uniform Sales Act.28 "Buyer," he declared, as
used in the statute, did not require any privity of contract in food
cases, and was not limited to the first purchaser, or even to a later one,
but must be held to include any ultimate consumer.27 There can be lit-
tIe doubt that the original draftsmen of the Act would have been con-
siderably startled, if not dismayed, by such an interpretation of their
handiwork, and it can only be characterized as a piece of judicial
legerdemain. The decision was followed in a series of later California
cases involving food and drink,28 in all of which it was assumed that
the strict liability was a matter of warranty, based upon and governed
by the Sales Act.
The extension of this strict liability beyond food for human con-
sumption began with animal food,20 and then with what might be
called products for intimate bodily use but external application, such
as hair dye, 0 permanent wave solutions3' and cigarettes.82 For a good
25 Id. at 284, 93 P.2d at 805.
26 "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer
relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or
not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such pur-
pose." 1 Umwoam LAws ANN. § 15(1) (1950); CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1735(1). This
provision is now replaced by § 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code.27 
"In adopting the statute here concerned as a part of the Uniform Sales Act, it
was the clear intent of the legislature that, with respect to foodstuffs, the implied war-
ranty provision therein contained should inure to the benefit of any ultimate purchaser
or consumer of food; and that it was not intended that a strict 'privity of contract!
would be essential for the bringing of an action by such ultimate consumer for an
asserted breach of the implied warranty." 14 Cal. 2d at 283, 93 P.2d at 804.28 Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945); Rubino
v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954); Vallis v. Canada Dry
Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961); Jones v. Burgermeister
Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961); Hampton v. Gebhardts
Chili Powder Co., 294 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1961).
29 McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (dog food); Midwest
Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959) (fish food).
30 Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
3l Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958)
(permanent wave solution); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App.
265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958) (same); Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co.,' 113 N.E.2d
many years California,33 in company with other jurisdictions, 4 refused
to go beyond this. The real breakthrough came in Michigan in 1958,
with Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.,30 in
which Justice Voelker found a warranty from the manufacturer to the
user of cinder building blocks, which by no stretch of the imagination
would be regarded as intended for any bodily use, or as "inherently
dangerous." This was immediately taken up by several other courts,"'
and the restriction as to food went overboard. In 1960 there came in
New Jersey the landmark decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, Inc.,8 which entered into the first full discussion of the rule, and
held the manufacturer and the retailer of an automobile to a warranty
of safety to the ultimate driver. The citadel of privity fell. What fol-
lowed was unquestionably the most sudden and spectacular overturn
of a well-established rule of law in the entire history of the law of
605 (Ohio App. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954)
(soap); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532
(1952) (detergent coming in contact with hands); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710,
174 A.2d 294 (1961) (same).
82 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961). Cf.
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960) (polio-
myelitis vaccine); Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (clothing); Bowles
v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) (surgical pin for setting bone
fracture).
3 3 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (insecti-
cide); Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955)
(ceiling joist); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941) (hot
water bottle); Young v. Aeroil Prod. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957) (portable
elevator).
34Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 327 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. App. 1959) (automobile);
Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956) (tractor); Jordan v.
Worthington Pump & Mach. Co., 73 Ariz. 329, 241 P.2d 433 (1952) (pump); Cochran
v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945) (antifreeze compound); Jordan
v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949) (same); Wood v. General Elec.
Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953) (electric blanket); Burgess v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 264 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1959) (ladder).
S5 The first case, involving a grinding wheel, was Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co.,
46 Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ct. C.P. 1951), which was overruled by Wood v.
General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953). Matthews v. Lawnlite Co.,
88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956), talked implied warranty of an aluminum rocking chair, but
apparently was disposed of on negligence.
.,6 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).37 Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d
40 (Fla. App. 1958) (electric cable); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501
(10th Cir. 1959) (tire); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568
(1959) (automobile); Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (airplane); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959) (house
trailer, with sweeping dictum as to all products).
3832 N'.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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torts.3 The latest count of the jurisdictions40 finds strict liability from
the manufacturer to the consumer the accepted rule, on one theory
or another, as to all products in a heavy majority of the courts, with
only eleven41 still insisting upon privity or negligence, and only two42
reiterating such a position in any decision since the avalanche started
with the Henningsen case.
39 The only remotely comparable overturn was the reversal of the rule denying
recovery for prenatal injuries, following Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1946). See PNossza, Toars 355-56 (3d ed. 1964).
So rapid was the change that § 402 A of the Second Restatement of Torts, dealing
with the strict liability, was drawn three times. As first submitted to and approved by
the American Law Institute in 1961 (Tentative Draft No. 6), it was limited to food
for human consumption. As again approved in 1962 (Tentative Draft No. 7), it was
expanded to include any product intended for intimate bodily use. The final version,
adopted in 1964 (Tentative Draft No. 10) extended to all products.
40 The jurisdictions are classified in Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MqNN. L.
Rrv. 791, 795-98 (1966). To avoid lengthy repetition, only the following summary of
the state of the law as of January 1, 1967, will be given here, with citations not in-
eluded in the Minnesota article:
Twenty-two courts now accept the strict liability as to all products: Arizona (prob-
ably), California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Tennessee, Washington (apparently). Missi~sippi, Nevada, and Oklahoma,
have been added since the publication of the Minnesota article. State Stove Mfg. Co.
v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Shoshoni Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski
(Nev. no. 5112, Dec. 7, 1966) - P.2d -; Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418
P.2d 900 (Oka. 1955). The last word from Pennsylvania, in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 215,
220 A.2d 853 (1966), is in accord, although Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320
(1966), handed down the same day, adhered to the former rule which applied the
limitation of the Uniform Commercial Code to purchasers and members of their house-
holds. The Webb case relies on the dissenting opinion in the Miller case.
In three jurisdictions federal courts, guessing at state law, have concluded that the
liability will be accepted: Indiana, Kansas, Vermont.
One court has intimated, without holding, that it will accept it: Wisconsin.
In five states it has been adopted by statute: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Vir-
ginia, Wyoming. A statute was adopted in Georgia, but it has been repealed.
In two states the development has not gone beyond products for intimate bodily
use: Hawaii, Louisiana (both federal decisions).
In six it has not gone beyond food: Nebraska, Puerto Rico, Utah (see Schneider
v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958)). There are food statutes in Montana,
South Carolina, and Rhode Island (R.I. Laws 1960, tit. 6A, § 2-315). The Texas Courts
of Civil Appeals are in disagreement, but the supreme court has not yet gone beyond
food, although federal decisions have done so.
41Delaware, Georgia (statute repealed), Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Mexico (by implication in Phares v. Sandia Lumber Co., 62 N.M.
90, 305 P.2d 367 (1956)), North Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia (dictum).
No law has been found in Alaska.
42 Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964); Henry
v. John W. Eshelman & Sons, 209 A.2d 46 (R.I. 1965).
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Among the first rush of cases was Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co. in
California, which forecast pretty clearly the future law of the state.
An employee of a corporation was injured by the bursting of a grind-
ing wheel made by the defendant. The District Court of Appeal43 dis-
carded privity as in the food cases, and allowed recovery on the basis
of a warranty. The opinion was vacated when the supreme court
granted a hearing;" but this did not prevent a federal court in New
York from relying upon it as established California law in finding a
warranty from the manufacturer of an airplane to a passenger.45 The
California supreme court was unwilling to go so far, and instead dealt
with the particular case by resorting to the expedient of stretching
"privity" to the breaking point, on the basis that the sale was made to
a corporation, and so it must necessarily have been intended that the
wheel would be used by some employee.46
Shortly after 1960 there were important developments in the way
of theory. Although the writer was perhaps the first to voice it,4" the
suggestion had always been sufficiently obvious that the "warranty"
which was not really a warranty at all, and never had been anything
more than a transparent device to achieve the desired objective, was
not only unnecessary but undesirable. No one denied that the "war-
ranty" was a matter of strict liability. No one disputed that in the ab-
sence of any contract between the parties, the liability must lie in tort.
Why not, then, jettison the contract word, and talk merely of strict
liability in tort, declared in its own right-a concept familiar enough
to all lawyers in the law of animals, abnormally dangerous activities,
nuisance, workmen's compensation, respondeat superior, defamation,
and even misrepresentation? The American Law Institute, considering
a first draft of a new section to be added to the Second Restatement
of Torts, accepted this proposal, and finally emerged with a section
that stated the strict liability without making use of "warranty" at all:
43 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. App. 1959).
44 For the benefit of any readers outside of California, it should be explained again
that under the peculiar procedure in this state, a hearing by the supreme court is on
appeal de novo from the trial court. The opinion of the District Court of Appeals is
vacated and stricken from the record. It is not officially published, and becomes as if
never written. It is considered a breach of etiquette for counsel to cite such an opinion,
at least without stating that it is vacated.
4 3Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
46 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575
(1960).
47 Prosser, supra note 14, at 1134.
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§ 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm
to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is sub-
ject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa-
ration and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
A comment48 was added to this section to make it clear that there
was nothing in the rule stated to prevent any court from characterizing
it as a matter of "warranty"; but that if so, it must be recognized that
such a warranty was of a very different kind from those usually found
in the sale of goods, and that it would not be subject to the various
contract rules which had grown up to surround such sales.
The first case in the country to adopt this approach was Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,4 9 in California in 1962. The plaintiff was
injured when a combination power tool, which could be used as a saw,
drill, or wood lathe, proved to be defective and let fly a piece of wood,
which struck him in the head. He brought action against the manu-
facturer, from whom he had not bought the tool. In the way of his
recovery stood not only the California refusal to extend the "warranty"
without privity beyond food, but also the plaintiff's failure to give
timely notice of the breach as required by the Uniform Sales Act."0
Justice Traynor met these obstacles by saying that this was not really
a matter of warranty at all, but of strict liability in tort.51 The prior talk
4 SESTATMENT (SEcorD), TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965).
49 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
50 "But if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to the seller
of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer
knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor." 1A
U Nwonm LAws AN. § 49 (1950); CAL. Crv. CODE § 1769. This has now been replaced
by § 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
51 "Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of
an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the
abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the
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of "Warranty" in the food cases, and the application of the definitions
in the Sales Act, were explained away as a matter of convenience of
the court, in that the definitions had provided appropriate standards
to be adopted under the particular circumstances.52 The requirement
of notice was not an appropriate one, and it would not be applied."
Warranty rules developed in commercial transactions were not to
govern.
54
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that
plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in
a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and
manufacture of which the plaintiff was not aware that made the
Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use. 5
The Greenman case has now been followed by several decisions in
California,50 and it was promptly accepted by other courts as the solu-
tion of their difficulties."' Strict liability in tort already appears to be
liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law... and the refusal to permit
the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products ...
make dear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but
by the law of strict liability in tort." 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d
at 901.
52 'It is true that in many of these situations the court has invoked the sales act
definitions of warranties (Civ. Code §§ 1732, 1735) in defining the defendant's lia-
bility, but it has done so, not because the statutes so required, but because they pro-
vided appropriate standards for the court to adopt under the circumstances presented."
Id. at 61, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700, 377 P.2d at 899-900.
53 Id. at 61, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900.
54
"Accordingly, rules defining and governing warranties that were developed to
meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the
manufacturer's liability to those injured by its defective products unless those rules also
serve the purpose for which such liability is imposed." Id. at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701,
377 P.2d at 901.
55 Id. at 64, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
56 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964) (automobile); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 754 (1963) (surface preparer); Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987,
41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964) (concrete cutting machine); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co.,
237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965) (dynamite); see Seely v. White Motor
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965) (truck).
57 Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (New York law); Put-
nam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (Texas law); Lartigue v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) (Louisiana law); Dagley v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965) (Indiana law); Greeno v. Clark
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 290,
216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965), affirming 51 III. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964); Dealers Transp. Co. v.
Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Jabukowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 80 N.J.
Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (App. Div. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 42 N.J. 177, 199
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sweeping the country. There is no reason to doubt that this is destined
to rank as the leading case in the final phase of the long development
of products liability.
In support of the decision, Justice Traynor made brief reference
to two justifications, which had been advanced for a number of years
by legal writers. One was that by placing the machine on the market
the maker had impliedly represented that it was safe for use, and the
plaintiff had purchased and used it in reliance upon that representa-
tion."" The other was the policy argument, which Justice Traynor him-
self had advocated before,59 and which he was later to repeat, 0 that
A.2d 826 (1964); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, C.C.H. NoDs. LLAm. REP. 11 5501
(Okla. 1965); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965); Webb
v. Zern, 422 Pa. 215, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); McMillen Feeds, Inc. of Texas v. Harlow,
405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189
So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399
(1963); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965),
affirmed on the ground of warranty, 6 Ohio St 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (1963) ("'strict tort liability' (surely a
more accurate phrase)").
58 "Implicit in the machine's presence on the market, however, was a representation
that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built. Under these circumstances, it
should not be controlling whether plaintiff selected the machine because of the state-
ments in the brochure, or because of the machine's own appearance of excellence that
belied the defect lurking beneath the surface, or because he merely assumed that it
would safely do the jobs it was built to do." 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377
P.2d at 901.
59 "Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an over-
whelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury
can be insured by the manufacturer, and distributed among the people as a cost of
doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products hav-
ing defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their
way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever
injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However in-
termittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the
risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there
should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to
afford such protection." Traynor, J., concurring in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
"The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Traynor,
J., in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr., 697, 701,
377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963).60 
"The rationale of that [Greenman] case does not rest on the analysis of the
financial strength or bargaining power of the parties to the particular action. It rests,
rather, on the proposition that 'The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
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the losses due to defective products should be placed upon the manu-
facturer, for the reason that he is in the better position to insure against
the liability, and to distribute it to the public by adding the cost of
such insurance to the price of his product. This "risk distribution" argu-
ment has received little mention in the decisions outside of California,6'
probably because it embarks upon a broad theory of "enterprise liabil-
ity" from which the courts thus far have tended to shy away. As the
Oregon court has pointed out,62 the argument would be no less applica-
ble to an injury inficted without fault by the manufacturer's delivery
truck. However that may be, the two justifications obviously rest upon
quite different grounds; and it appears inevitable that the California
courts will be confronted with a choice between them.63
It would be easy to overestimate the importance of the shift of
theory in the Greenman case. It is warranty that has gone overboard,
and with it all idea that the plaintiff's recovery is founded on a con-
tract, as well as the statutory provisions of the Sales Act and the Uni-
form Commercial Code. In particular it is the defenses, such as lack of
notice to the seller and disclaimers, which are out of the window. The
substance of the liability itself remains unchanged. The cases of war-
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a
cost of doing business.' [Citing the concurring opinion in the Escola case.]" Traynor,
C.J., in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23, 403 P.2d
145, 151 (1965).
61Judge Wisdom approved it in Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317
F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), and it received a line in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
62 "The rationale of risk spreading and compensating the victim has no special
relevancy to cases involving injuries resulting from the use of defective goods. The
reasoning would seem to apply not only in cases involving personal injuries arising from
the sale of defective goods, but equally to any case where an injury results from the risk
creating conduct of the seller in any stage of the production and distribution of goods.
Thus a manufacturer would be strictly liable even in the absence of fault for an injury
to a person struck by one of the manufacturer's trucks being used in transporting his
goods to market. It seems to us that the enterprise liability rationale employed in the
Escola case proves too much and that if adopted would compel us to apply the principle
of strict liability in all future cases where the loss could be distributed.
"Although we believe that it is the function of the judiciary to modify the law of
torts to fit the changing needs of society, we feel that the judicial extension of the
theory of strict liability to all cases where it is convenient for those engaged in com-
merce to spread the risk would not be advisable. If enterprise liability is to be so ex-
tended, there is a strong argument for limiting the victim's measure of recovery to some
scheme of compensation similar to that employed in workmen's compensation. The
legislature alone has the power to set up such a compensation scheme. The court can-
not put a limit upon the jury's verdict." O'Connell, J., in Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc.,
241 Ore. 301, 309-10, 405 P.2d 624, 628-29 (1965).
63 See text accompanying note 135 infra.
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ranty, whether on a direct sale between the parties or to the consumer
without privity, are still important precedents in determining what it
is that the seller has undertaken to deliver.64
With warranty laid to rest, what remains in California for the con-
sumer who is not in privity of contract with the defendant is the strict
liability in tort, together with the old MacPherson liability for negli-
gence. The latter may quite possibly support recovery in a few occa-
sional cases", to which the strict liability does not extend. Because of
the many uncertainties surrounding unfamiliar law, negligence is still
commonly pleaded as an alternative basis for recovery, and so may be
expected to appear in the decisions for a good many years to come;
but there will obviously be few instances in which it will accomplish
anything that the strict liability does not.
The rest of this discussion will consist of a review of the California
decisions as to both negligence and strict liability, with some specula-
tion as to what the court may do about questions with which it has not
yet been faced.66
What Products?
The negligent seller of any product is clearly liable for any foresee-
able harm it may do to the ultimate user. Any idea of a possible limita-
tion to products which, even if negligently made, are "inherently" or
"imminently" dangerous disappeared in the nineteen-forties.67 The
recovery in a number of cases6" of damage to property makes it clear
that it is no longer required, if indeed it ever was, that the product be
64 "Although the rules of warranty frustrate rational compensation for physical in-
jury, they function well in a commercial setting.... These rules determine the quality
of the product the manufacturer promises and thereby determine the quality he must
deliver." Traynor, CJ., in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 22, 403 P.2d 145, 150 (1965).65Perhaps, for example, as to products unavoidably dangerous (see text accom-
panying notes 78-96 infra), and injuries to bystanders (text accompanying notes 135-
142 infra).
66 There is unavoidable duplication of much that is said in Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel, 50 MmNe. L. REv. 791 (1966).
67 Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942) (chair); Hale v. De-
paoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948) (porch railing); Larramendy v. Myers, 126
Cal. App. 2d 636, 272 P.2d 824 (1954) (smoke-producing device for dancing act).
68 Kolberg v. Sherwin Williams Co., 98 Cal. App. 609, 269 Pac. 975 (1928);
Quirici v. Freeman, 98 Cal. App. 2d 194, 219 P.2d 897 (1950); Tremeroli v. Austin
Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 464, 227 P.2d 923 (1951); Fentress v. Van Etta
Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958); Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857,
13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr.
689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963); Mack v. Hugh W. Comstock Associates, 225 Cal. App.
2d 583, 37 Cal. Eptr. 466 (1964).
foreseeably dangerous to human safety. The liability clearly extends
to the negligent design of a product,69 and to failure to give a proper
warning of known dangers attendant upon its anticipated use.70
So far as strict liability is concerned, there can be no doubt that it
applies to all kinds of products, 71 and that whatever restrictions there
may have been in the past as to food and drink, intimate bodily use, or
a high degree of danger, are now of purely historical interest. The later
decisions72 apparently have given final interment to the rather meta-
physical distinction between the product sold and its container, which
formerly appeared as an element of confusion in the food cases.73 There
are, however, two problems with which the California courts may yet
have difficulty.
One of these concerns products which are expected to be processed,
or otherwise altered, after they have left the seller and before they
reach the consumer. Because of the dearth of cases, the Restatement
has left the question open in a caveat.74 By way of comment, it has
suggested that the problem is one of whether the responsibility for
discovery and remedy of the danger is shifted to the intermediate
handler, which will turn in part at least upon the reasonable expecta-
tion that he will take care of it.75 The seller of raw pork, which is ex-
pected to be cooked before it is made into sausage, is certainly not to
be held liable when it is packed half raw into the casings. 6 On the
other hand, if raw coffee beans are sold to a buyer who is to do no
more than roast, grind and pack them, it cannot be supposed that the
69 Brooks v. Alis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 410, 329 P.2d 575 (1958);
Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1962). But a seller
who makes a product to the buyer's design is not liable to another when the product is
properly made and the injury is due to the design. Krentz v. Union Carbide Corp., 365
F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1966).
70 Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947); Briggs v.
National Indus., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949); Call v. Union Ice Co.,
108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal.
App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
71 See cases cited note 56 supra.
72 Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 196, 33 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1963);
Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961);
Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961).
Compare, as to direct sales, Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 814 (1963); Lai Wum Chin Mock v. Belfast Beverages, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 2d
770, 14 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1961).
7 3 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Gordon
v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949).
74 REsTATmENT (SzcoND), TonTS § 402A, caveat (2) (1965).
71 ESTATEMENT (SE.cOND), TORTS § 402A, comment p.
76 Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958).
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seller will escape the liability when they are contaminated with arsenic
or some other poison. The nature of the defect and the degree of
danger are no doubt important, and so is the relation of the parties;
and undoubtedly there are some defects as to which the responsibility
cannot be shifted. The maker of an automobile with a defective steer-
ing gear, or a leak in the hydraulic, brake line, can have no hope of
relief from his responsibility by reason of the fact that the car is sold
to a dealer who is expected to service it, adjust the brakes, mount the
tires, and the like, before it is ready for use. 7
The second, and more important, question concerns products that
are in themselves unavoidably dangerous. Whiskey is such a product.
It causes a variety of calamities, from cirrhosis of the liver to drunken
driving, and its widely publicized evils were the foundation of a
political party that is still in existence. Butter, according to the latest
medical theory, is such a product; it deposits cholesterol in the arteries
and brings on heart attacks. The whole pharmacopoeia is full of drugs,
such as rabies vaccine,78 which are not safe and, in the present state
of expert knowledge, cannot be made safe, no matter how carefully
they are manufactured and administered. New and valuable ones are
flooding continuously upon the market, whose dangers, as was the
case with penicillin and cortisone, cannot be known until experience
has demonstrated them. Where only negligence is in question, the
answer as to such products is a simple one. The utility and social value
of the thing sold clearly outweighs the known, and all the more so the
unknown risk, and there is no negligence in marketing the product.
But what is to be the rule as to strict liability? Does the maker of
whiskey, butter, the drug, or even an automobile, become automat-
ically responsible for all the harm that such things do in the world?
It was undoubtedly to forestall such a possibility that the Restate-
ment79 limited its new section to products "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."
It is here that the warranty cases, whether upon a direct sale to the
user or without privity, furnish something of a guide. There are
77 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d
168 (1964), and text infra, at notes 174-78.
78 In Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729 (1941), re-
covery was denied because the plaintiff was informed of the risk and assumed it. As to
the drug problem generally, see Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug
Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RuTcmas L. R-Ev. 947 (1964); Spangenberg, Aspects of
Warranties Relating to Defective Prescription Drugs, 37 U. CoLo. L. REv. 194 (1965);
Notes, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 515 (1963); 13 STAr. L. RaV. 645 (1961); 65 YAL. L.J.
262 (1955).
7 9 BSTATFIENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 402A (1965).
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first of all the cases of defects regarded as "natural" to the product, or
as it is sometimes put, reasonably to be expected to be found in it, such
as a flshbone in fish served in a restaurant, or a cherry pit in a piece of
cherry pie,80 for which all the courts consistently have refused to find
strict liability. There are other cases that have come to a similar con-
clusion as to such things as cement, with its unavoidable danger of
injury if it comes in contact with the person.81 There are also numerous
cases dealing with allergies, in which the rule has been worked out
that if the product is reasonably safe for the normal user the seller
does not become liable for the harm to the abnormal one.82 If he is, or
so Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936) (chicken bone
in chicken pie); Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P.2d 76 (1938)
(turkey bone in roast turkey); Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.
Cal. 1955) (fishbone in fish dish); Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass.
421, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964) (fishbone in fish chowder); Wieland v. C. A. Swanson
& Sons, 223 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1955) (chicken bone in chicken fricassee); Norris v. Pig
'N Whistle Sandwich Shop, 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718 (1949) (fragment of bone
in meat sandwich); Goodwin v. Country Club, 323 11. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944)
(bone in creamed chicken); Brown v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941)
(sliver of bone in pork chops); Courter v. Dilbert Bros., 19 Misc. 2d 935, 186 N.Y.S.2d
334 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (piece of prune pit in prune butter); Adams v. The Great Atl
& Pac. Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92 (1960) (crystallized grain of corn in corn
flakes); Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960) (small bit of shell
in fried oysters); Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 178 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 1965)
(cherry pit in cherry pie); Hunt v. Ferguson-Paulus Enterprises, 415 P.2d 13 (Ore.
1966) (same).
Otherwise when the defect is not reasonably to be expected in the product sold.
Arnaud's Restaurant v. Cotter, 212 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954) (piece of crab shell in
pompano en papillotte); Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods Mfrs., Inc., 322 III. App. 586, 54
N.E.2d 759 (1944) (bone in noodle soup mix); Lore v. De Simone Bros., 12 Misc. 2d
174, 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (bone in sausage); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh
Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942) (large piece of shell in oysters);
Wood v. Waldorf System, Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951) (chicken bone in chicken
soup); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960) (chicken
bone in chicken sandwich).
81 Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d 190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956); Katz
v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959); Baker v. Stewart
Sand & Material Co., 353 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. App. 1961); Imperial v. Central Concrete,
Inc., 1 App. Div. 2d 671, 146 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1955), aff'd mem. 2 N.Y.2d 939, 142
N.E.2d 209 (1957); Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946, 227 P.2d
173 (1961).
s2 Zager v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 324, 86 P.2d 389 (1939);
Stanton v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 IIl. App. 496, 38 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Ross v.
Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., 136 Me. 118, 3 A.2d 650 (1939); Casagrande v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 340 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960); Jacquot v. Win. Filene's Sons
Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958); Graham v. Jordan Marsh Co., 319 Mass.
690, 67 N.E.2d 404 (1946); Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d
502 (1941); Cleary v. John M. Maris Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct.
1940); Bennett v. Pilot Prods. Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951); see Hanrahan
v. Wagreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955).
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should be, aware that a substantial number of the prospective con-
sumers will be allergic to the ingredients, even though they represent
only a small percentage of the total population, he is required to give
due warning of the danger;83 and no doubt if the warning is not given
the product is to be considered unsafe and there will be strict liabil-
ity.8" But if it is given the defendant does not become liable merely
because he has sold the thing at all.
The cases of hepatitis resulting from blood transfusions all have
held that the supplier of the blood is not strictly liable on a warranty,
usually on the rather shaky ground85 that the transfusion itself is not
a sale but a "service."86 There are, however, a few cases of remote
suppliers that have refused to find strict liability;87 and the stress laid
in all of the decisions upon the unavoidability of the risk appears defi-
nitely to suggest that this is the real reason for the conclusion.8 8 There
are even two or three late cases89 that have rejected strict liability as
83 Briggs v. National Indus., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949);
Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Hungerholt v. Land 0'
Lakes Creameries, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 177 (D. Minn. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 352 (8th
Cir. 1963); Taylor v. Newcomb Baking Co., 317 Mass. 609, 59 N.E.2d 293 (1945);
Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958); Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New
Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960); Bianchi v. Denhoim & McKay Co.,
302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939); Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45,
143 N.W. 48 (1913); Zirpola v. Adams Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73
(Ct. Err. & App. 1939). Cf. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48
(1951); Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947).84 Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965);
Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
85 It may be suggested that the hospital normally bills the blood as a separate
item, and there is no more difficulty in finding a sale than in the case of food prepared
in its kitchen.86 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Dibblee
v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961);
Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Sloneker
v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964).
87Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd mem.
280 App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1952); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memo-
rial Blood Bank, 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood
Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964); Whitehursh v. American Natl
Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965).
88 See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Lia-
bility, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367-68 (1965). In Russell v. Community Blood Bank,
Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966), the court found a sale of the blood, but refused
to impose strict liability because the defect was unavoidable.
89 Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965);
Lewis v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400 (Ore. 1966); McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d
736 (Fla. 1965). In Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Ill.
1964), allegations in the complaint were held to be sufficient.
The drug in question was known as MER-29, the formula nowhere stated. It had
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to one new and largely experimental drug, which proved to have such
disastrous side-effects that it had to be withdrawn from the market.
The conclusion would be clearly indicated that, provided that the
product, so far as is known at the time of the sale, is reasonably safe
for its intended use, there is no liability for unavoidable dangers-if
it were not for the state of confusion surrounding the question of lung
cancer from smoking cigarettes. There are two federal decisions" that
have denied strict liability on the part of the manufacturer, on the
ground that at the time of sale the danger could not have been known.
There is one9' which, by a two-to-one vote,92 found not only an ex-
press warranty, but also an "implied warranty" to the consumer, that
all cigarettes were safe to smoke. There is still another in which the
Fifth Circuit first put the wrong question to the supreme court of
Florida, 3 and then, assuming what apparently has turned out to be
the wrong answer to the right one,9" left the issue to a jury,9 5 which
been developed experimentally, and found effective in the reduction of cholesterol in
the blood; but after it was marketed the reports were that it was causing eye cataracts,
and it was withdrawn from the market. According to the A.T.L.A. News Letter for
April, 1966, p. 101, more than 350 cases involving this drug were pending in New York
City alone.
In accord, as to another drug is Cockran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904 (Ore. 1966). See,
however, Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966), where the
facts as to knowledge are not clear.
90 Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) (Louisiana
law); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (Missouri law).
91 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (Penn-
sylvania law). On a second trial the jury found for the defendant, and this was again
reversed, for error in instructing on assumption of risk, when there was no evidence
that plaintiff was aware of the risk. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d
479 (3d Cir. 1965).
92 Goodrich, J., concurred specially as to express warranty, but refused to go along
with the implied warranty, and asked about other products, such as whiskey.
19 It was first held that a verdict for the defendant must be sustained, on the basis
of a special answer of the jury, that at the time of sale the defendant could not reason-
ably have known that the cigarettes would cause cancer. Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962). Counsel then persuaded the court to put to the supreme
court of Florida, the question whether the fact that the defendant could not have known
the product was dangerous would prevent an implied warranty under Florida law.
"We conclude also that the question thus framed does not present for our considera-
tion the issue of whether the cigarettes which caused a cancer in this particular instance
were as a matter of law unmerchantable in Florida under the stated conditions, nor does
it request a statement of the scope of warranty implied in the circumstances of this case."
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963). In a footnote the
Florida court referred to "the problem of individual reactions to ordinarily harmless sub-
stances, discussion of which we deem unwarranted here because of the lack of Florida
precedent and the limited issue posed in this nonadversary proceeding." Id. at 170 n.2.
94 In the light of McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965), and
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966).
95"The defendant argues, however, that even under that [Florida] definition, it
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disposed of it by finding for the defendant."' There the matter rests.
It may be unfortunate that these cases dealt at this time with an issue
about which there has been so much popular outcry as lung cancer
from smoking; and one may at least question whether the last two de-
cisions would have gone the same way if another product, such as
whiskey or ether, had been involved.
What Defendants?
The negligence liability in California has been extended not only
to the manufacturer of the whole product, but also to the maker of a
component part,97 and to an assembler of parts supplied by others. 8
It has been applied to dealers, whether at retail99 or at wholesale, 00
although it is obvious that due care will not require as much of the
dealer as of the manufacturer."0" The liability has gone beyond sellers,
and has been applied to one who merely does repair work on the
was entitled to a directed verdict because there was no evidence that Lucky Strike
cigarettes were not 'reasonably fit and wholesome.' To products intended for human con-
sumption, and the use of which may cause injury or death, the jury may properly apply
a very strict standard of reasonableness." Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d
673, 676 (5th Cir. 1963).
o Reported in C.C.H. PRoDs. Lmn. REP. 'f 5341 (S.D. Fla. 1964). On the whole
problem, see Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CosmML L.Q.
678 (1966).
97 Edison v. Lewis Mfg. Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 429, 336 P.2d 286 (1959) (ring for
safety belt). Accord, Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576, motion
denied, 259 N.Y. 664, 182 N.E. 225 (1932); Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F.2d 820 (10 Cir.
1944); State ex rel. Woodzell v. Garzell Plastics Indus., 152 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich.
1957) (Maryland law); Fredericks v. American Export Lines, 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.
1955); Willey v. Fyrogas Co., 363 Mo. 406, 251 S.W.2d 635 (1952); Carson v. Weston
Hotel Corp., 342 Ill. App. 602, 97 N.E.2d 620 (1951).
98 Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942). Accord, Rauch v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 252 Iowa 1, 104 N.W.2d 607 (1960);
Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958); Spencer v. Madsen,
142 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1944); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99
N.W.2d 627 (1959).
99 Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951); Baker v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
100 Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311
(1961).
101 Thus the dealer is under no duty to inspect or test a product sold in a sealed
container, or apparently safe. Cobin v. Avenue Food Mart, 178 Cal. App. 2d 345, 2
Cal. Rptr. 822 (1960); Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co., 108 Cal. App. 22, 290 Pac. 919
(1930); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941). He is, how-
ever, required to make a reasonable inspection of such a product as an automobile.
Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
chattel, 02 or turns it over under a contract to have work done on it'"
and even to the builder of a building who sells it. °" A bailor for hire,
or otherwise for his own benefit, is held to the full duty of reasonable
c6re, including inspection to discover unknown defects. 05 This state,10 6
however, appears to agree with numerous others, that a gratuitous
lender or donor is not required to inspect, 07 and is liable only for a
failure to disclose dangers of which he is aware. 08
So far as strict liability is concerned, no case has been found in any
jurisdiction which has imposed it upon anyone who was not engaged
in the business of supplying goods of the particular kind. The Restate-
ment of Torts'0 9 has so limited the liability. When a housewife, on one
occasion, sells a jar of jam to her neighbor, or the owner of an auto-
mobile trades it in to a dealer, the undertaking to the public and the
justified reliance upon that undertaking on the part of the ultimate
purchaser are conspicuously lacking.
Elsewhere warranty to the consumer has been imposed upon the
maker of a component part, unchanged when assembled,110 and upon
102 Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932). Cf. Cowles
v. Independent Elevator Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 109, 70 P.2d 711 (1937) (inspecting
elevator); Supera v. Moreland Sales Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 186, 56 P.2d 595 (1936)
(reconditioning and selling truck).
103 Sloboden v. Time Oil Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 557, 281 P.2d 85 (1955). Cf.
McCall v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 123 Cal. 42, 55 Pac. 706 (1898) (shipowner furnishing
sling to contractor for use on ship).
104 Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948). Cf. Hall v. Barber Door
Co., 218 Cal. 412, 23 P.2d 279 (1933) (contractor installing doors); Sabella v. Wisler,
59 Cal. 2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963) (contractor working on building);
Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961) (same as to
swimming pool).
10 5 Tierstein v. Licht, 174 Cal. App. 2d 835, 345 P.2d 341 (1959); Varas v. Barco
Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1962); Zucker v. Passetti Trucking
Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 260, 12 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1961); Rohar v. Osborne, 133 Cal. App.
2d 345, 284 P.2d 125 (1955); McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d 740, 255 P.2d 810
(1953).
106 See Rocha v. Garcia, 203 Cal. 167, 263 Pac. 238 (1928); The Pegeen, 14
F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Cal. 1936); Tierstein v. Licht, 174 Cal. App. 2d 835, 345 P.2d 341
(1959); Kite v. Coastal Oil Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 336, 328 P.2d 45 (1958).
'o Gagnon v. Dana, 69 N.H. 264, 39 Ad. 982 (1897); Johnson v. H. M. Bullard
Co., 95 Conn. 251, 111 Adt. 70 (1920); Davis v. Sanderman, 225 Iowa 1001, 228 N.W.
717 (1938); Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 209 Minn. 248, 296 N.W. 136 (1941); Nel-
son v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 20 N.J. Super. 198, 89 A.2d 445 (1952), afd, 11 N.J.
413, 94 A.2d 655 (1953).
10 8 See cases cited note 107 supra. Also Russell Constr. Co. v. Ponder, 143 Tex.
412, 186 S.W.2d 233 (1945); Logan v. Hope, 139 Ga. 589, 77 S.E. 809 (1913); Stur-
tevant v. Pagel, 134 Tex. 46, 130 S.W.2d 1017 (1939); Clancy v. R. O'Brien & Co.,
345 Mass. 772, 187 N.E.2d 865 (1963).
109 RESTATEMENT (SEcoiNw), ToRTs § 402A, and comment f (1965).
110 McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965); Putnam v. Erie
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an assembler of parts;' 1 and it may certainly be anticipated that Cali-
fornia will agree. In this state the warranty has been applied to deal-
ers, whether at retail" 2 or at wholesale,-" and the reluctance to burden
such sellers which has troubled a very few other courts 14 has not been
manifested. The strict liability in tort of the Greenman case" 5 has
been applied to a direct sale from the dealer to the plaintiff,"" and so,
as to physical harm,l has superseded the direct warranty. There are
no California cases as yet as to non-sellers. In New Jersey the strict
liability without privity has been imposed upon a lessor," 8 and upon
a defendant who constructed a building and sold it." 9 It appears quite
probable that these decisions will be accepted in California. The re-
pairman has not yet put in an appearance anywhere, and there can
only be speculation as to whether the line is to be drawn at one who
has transferred some interest in the thing itself in the course of his
business.
City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Taylerson v. American Airlines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 882
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). The last named case is no doubt supplanted by Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), in which
the maker of an altimeter was relieved from liability on the unusual ground that the
plaintiff has sufficient remedy against the maker of the plane. Accord, Montgomery v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). And in Halpern v.
Jad Constr. Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 875, 244 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1963), this was applied to
a tire on a tractor.
111 Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Ford Motor Co.
v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108
(Fla. App. 1963). In Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 270 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup.
Ct. 1966), one who initiated the manufacture of nails and supplied specifications and
a container marked with his trade name was held liable on an implied warranty.
1 12 Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954); cf.
Gindraux v. Maurice Mercantile Co., 4 Cal. 2d 206, 47 P.2d 708 (1935).
's Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954); Jones
v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961);
Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
114 See, for example, Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961);
Elmore v. Grenada Grocery Co., 189 Miss. 370, 197 So. 761 (1940); De Gouveia v.
H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336 (1936).
11559 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
"6 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d
168 (1964).
117 But apparently not as to pecuniary loss. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
"8 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965). In Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Eng'r Co., 243 A.C.A. 1002, 52 Cal. Rptr.
842 (1966), it was assumed, without deciding, that this case would be followed.
"9 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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What Plaintiffs?
The negligence liability clearly extends to any lawfu1120 user of
the thing supplied;' 21 and on the basis of the unreasonable risk created
it has been extended to all those who, as the Restatement 22 now puts
it, should be "expected to be endangered by its probable use," includ-
ing a mere bystander, or a pedestrian in the path of a car.2 3 In short,
to any foreseeable plaintiff.
The strict liability also applies in favor of any lawful user or con-
sumer, in the broadest sense of the term, including the employees of
the ultimate purchaser, 124 the members of his family, 25 his guests, 2 6
120 There has been no decision anywhere as yet as to an unlawful user, such as a
thief or a trespasser. It appears unlikely that the liability would be found.
121 Employees: Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr.
514 (1964); Edison v. Lewis Mfg. Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 429, 336 P.2d 286 (1959);
Di Muro v. Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 784, 14 Cal. Rptr.
551 (1961) (violation of statute); McClelland v. Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d
698, 207 P.2d 591 (1949); Brooks v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 410,
329 P.2d 575 (1958); Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.
1951); The S.S. Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947); Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co.,
205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1962); Sloboden v. Time Oil Co., 131 Cal.
App. 2d 557, 281 P.2d 85 (1955); Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal. 2d 229,
34 P.2d 481 (1934).
Customer sitting in chair: Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942).
Invitee of bailee: Tierstein v. Licht, 174 Cal. App. 2d 835, 345 P.2d 341 (1959).
122 P TsA / ENTr (SEcoND), TORTs § 395 (1965).
123 Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951) (bystander);
Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952) (passenger in other car). Accord,
Gaidry Motors v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co.,
196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.
1959); Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954); Grey-
hound Corp. v. Brown, 269 Ala. 520, 113 So. 2d 916 (1959); McLeod v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927).
124 Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964);
Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 770, 14 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1961);
Jones v.'Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961);
Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
125 Kein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Gotts-
danker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9
N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v.
Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
126 Deveny v. Bheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Tomezuk v. Town
of Cheshire, 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (1965); Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 70 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 1954); Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc. 2d 312,
169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Dipanegrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wash. 2d 720, 393
P.2d 936 (1964).
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and his donee.127 A passenger in an airplane 12 or an automobie 1 9 has
been held to be such a user; and so have a customer in a beauty shop
to whose hair a dye was applied, 30 a child injected with poliomyelitis
vaccine, 31 a shopper about to buy in a self-service market, 32 a wife
cooking rabbits for her husband's dinner with no intention of eating
them herself, 33 and even a filling station mechanic doing work on a
car.
34
This is clear enough. But bystanders and other non-users of the
product present a more difficult problem, which raises a fundamental
question as to the basis of the strict liability. If it rests upon a policy
of risk distribution,3 " which imposes upon the seller liability without
fault for any harm done by a defective product, because he is in the
better position to insure against it and to pass on the cost, then there
is no reason whatever to distinguish between the pedestrian hit by an
127 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939). Cf. Simp-
son v. Powered Products, Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (1963) (lessee).
128Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Cali-
fornia law); Public Adm'r v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Middlleton v. United
Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp.,
204 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp.
216 (D. Minn. 1962); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. App. 1963);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963).
129 Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Hacker v. Rector,
250 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Haley v. Merritt Chevrolet Co., C.C.H. Pnons.
Lr.m. Rn'. ff 5512 (Ill. App. 1966). Cf. McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th
Cir. 1965) (ship passenger).
130 Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 290, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Graham v.
Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
131 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
Cf. Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) (surgical pin for setting
bone fractures).
132 Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 196, 33 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1963);
Rogers v. Karem, 405 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1966). Cf. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339
F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (pro-
spective purchasers trying out product).
SHaut v. Kleene, 320 Ill. App. 273, 50 N.E.2d 855 (1943).
134 Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Sup. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963) (express warranty
in advertising).
In Gutierrez v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. App. 1966), it was alleged
that plaintiff came in contact with a glass door in a passageway. The court assumed, on
the basis of the Restatement, that he was required to be a "user or consumer," but held
that the allegation was sufficient to "shadow forth the semblance of a cause of action,"
since it was "susceptible of the inference that plaintiff was using such doors." Id. at
604.
135 See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
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automobile and its driver-nor is there any good reason to distinguish
the man hit by the seller's delivery truck, or one injured on his premises.
If, on the other hand, the theory is one of an implied representation of
safety, made by placing the goods on the market, and of reliance upon
such assurance, or on the created appearance of safety, then it is obvi-
ous that the pedestrian is not the man the seller has sought to reach,
that no assurance has been given to him, and that he has relied upon
nothing. All that he has done is to be there when the accident occurs;
and in this he does not differ from any other plaintiff. Both justifica-
tions were stated in the Greenman case; and it would appear that a
choice must be made between them.
In other jurisdictions it is the second of these theories that has, in
general, been adopted; and the strict liability has thus far been rejected
as to the non-user by most of the decisions.13 Last year, however, the
Michigan court kicked over the traces, and found strict liability when
a shotgun exploded and injured a bystander.'81 This was followed by
one case in a lower court in Connecticut,8 8 which is contradicted by
another such court."9 More recently, the Fifth Circuit, which pur-
ported to apply Florida law, joined Michigan when a cabin cruiser
blew up and set fire to other boats moored in the vicinity. 40 It may
still be too early to say whether these decisions represent a new break-
through to the ultimate triumph of the "risk distribution" theory, or
136 Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (pedestrian hit by car);
Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955) (guest opening glass jar);
Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Fla. App. 1962) (bystander); Hahn
v. Ford Motor Co., 256 Iowa 27, 126 N.W.2d 350 (1964) (driver of colliding car);
Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1965)
(passengers in colliding car); Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374
P.2d 549 (1962) (cafe wrecked by explosion of propane gas). See also, in a jurisdiction
not recognizing strict liability without privity, Alexander Funeral Home, Inc. v. Pride,
261 N.C. 723, 136 S.E.2d 120 (1964) (building run into by car). In Courtois v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962), where the plaintiff was hit by a
wheel that came off of a truck, the question was left open and the case decided on
other grounds.
137 Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
138 Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965). There is also
Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 422 Pa. 215 (1966), where a bystander who was the
brother of the purchaser was allowed to recover without discussion of his status. He
had shortly before tapped the keg of beer which exploded, which may perhaps have
made him a user; and in view of the Pennsylvania reliance on the Uniform Commercial
Code as to "members of the household" in Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320
(1966), and Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), it
is not at all clear that any other bystander would recover.
23 9 Kuschy v. Norris, 25 Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d 275 (1964).
140 Trojan Boat Co. v. Lutz, 358 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1966).
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whether they are ultimately to be regarded only as isolated and spo-
radic departures. The only decision in California,141 where the plain-
tiff's road grader was hit by a defective automobile, went off on the
clearly erroneous ground, which has been rejected by the supreme
court, 142 that there could be no strict liability for damage to property.
This is certainly the major problem among the issues not yet deter-
mined in this state.
What Damages?
There can be no doubt that the negligence liability covers any kind
of physical harm, including damage to the defective chattel itself, as
where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its own bad brakes,
14
as well as damage to any other property in the vicinity.1 44
Personal injury has long dominated the strict liability cases, if only
because it is the obvious consequence of bad food. The elimination of
"warranty" in California has laid to rest any lingering doubt1 45 there
might have been as to whether there could be recovery for wrongful
death resulting from a breach of warranty.14 With the extension of
141 Brewer v. Reliable Automotive Co., 240 A.C.A. 175, 49 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1966).
The only other California case remotely bearing on the question is Gutierrez v. Superior
Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. App. 1966).
142 "Plaintiff contends that, even though the law of warranties governs the eco-
nomic relations between the parties, the doctrine of strict liability in tort should be
extended to govern physical injury to plaintiff's property, as well as personal injury.
We agree with this contention. Physical injury to property is so akin to personal injury
that there is no reason to distinguish them." Traynor, C.J., in Seely v. White Motor
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24, 403 P.2d 145, 152 (1965).
143 Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 464, 227 P.2d 923
(1951); Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958);
Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961) (swimming
pool); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963) (build-
ing). These cases overrule Judson-Pacific-Murphy, Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 127 Cal.
App. 2d 828, 275 P.2d 841 (1954).
144 Quirici v. Freeman, 98 Cal. App. 2d 194, 219 P.2d 897 (1950); Mack v. Hugh
W. Comstock Associates, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 2d 583, 37 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1964); Basin
Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122 (1954) (direct
sale); Kolberg v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 93 Cal. App. 609, 269 Pac. 975 (1928).
1-5 Some courts formerly denied recovery, as in Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc. v.
Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1944); S. H. Kress & Co. v. Lindsey, 262 Fed.
331 (5th Cir. 1919); Whiteley v. Webb's City, Inc., 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951); Good-
win v. Misticos, 207 Miss. 361, 42 So. 2d 397 (1949); Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N.H.
365, 189 Ad. 865 (1937).
146 Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Cali-
fornia law); Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Mont-
gomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Siegel v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Middlleton v. United Aircraft
Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202
the rule to products other than food, physical harm to property entered
the picture; and recovery has generally been allowed both for damage
to the defective chattel itself, 4' and for harm to other property, as
where a building is wrecked by the explosion of a gasoline stove.14
A late dictum of the California supreme court1 49 appears to make it
quite clear that both lines of cases will be followed.
Pecuniary loss, mere pocketbook damage, offers greater difficulties.
There is nothing inherent in the character of such loss to prevent its
compensation with or without negligence; and the very first case'5"
in which the Washington court declared the strict liability as to food
allowed recovery for loss of goodwill wh6n a restaurant served bad
meat to its customers. Strict liability has been found without any reluc-
tance when the defective product is made into something else, so that
there is an indirect kind of physical harm to other property.'- The
Illinois court8 2 has found it by way of indemnity when the driver of
a defective car incurred liability to others in a collision with a bus.
The troublesome question concerns the manufacturer's liability
for mere loss on the bargain-which is to say that the thing the plain-
F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d
432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269
F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. App.
1963); cf. Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54 (1965).
14 Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. App. 1963); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961);
Jamot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
14 8 Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Rasmus v.
A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958); McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121
F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d
547 (Mo. 1959); Burrus Feed Mills, Inc. v. Reeder, 391 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965).
149 See note 142 supra. This appears to overrule Brewer v. Reliable Automotive Co.,
240 A.C.A. 175, 49 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1966).
150 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
151Hayman v. Shoemake, 203 Cal. App. 2d 140, 21 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1962) (crop
grown from seed, express warranty); Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267
F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1959) (batch of dough ruined by glass in ice); Hoskins v. Jackson
Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (crop grown from seed); Spence v. Three Rivers
Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (cinder blocks
used in a house); of. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (fabrics made into garments, express war-
ranty).
'
52 Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Compare,
on direct warranty, Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d 869, 280 P.2d 235 (1954);
Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122 (1954);
Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680, 160 P.2d 832 (1945); Pezel v. Yerex, 56 Cal. App.
304, 205 Pac. 475 (1922).
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tiff has purchased has less value than it was supposed to have.' 53 The
difficulty is that the existence, and the extent, of any loss on the bar-
gain must depend upon what the bargain is; and the bargain is made
with the dealer from whom the plaintiff buys, and not with the manu-
facturer. The loss turns not only on the value of the thing received, but
also upon the price paid and the dealer's undertaking. If he overprices
the goods, or sells Grade 2 as Grade 1, there will be a loss on the bar-
gain even if the product is not defective at all, and of course all the
more so if it is-but how much of that loss is to be attributed to the
manufacturer? What if the plaintiff trades in his old automobile on a
new one, and is given an inadequate allowance? If the goods are sold
"as is," there will be no loss on the bargain at all; and if the dealer mis-
represents their quality, or adds a warranty of his own, such a loss may
arise where it would not otherwise exist. 54
These arguments might be persuasive to the effect that a mere loss
on the bargain, as distinguished perhaps from other and more conse-
quential pecuniary loss, is a matter to be determined in the first
instance between the plaintiff and the dealer; and that if the manu-
facturer is to be liable, it should be to the dealer, and in an amount
which may be less, or conceivably even more, than the dealer's own
liability. They undoubtedly underlie the refusal, in all of the decided
cases, 5  to allow recovery against the manufacturer for a loss on the
bargain resulting from his negligence. There are not many cases deal-
ing with strict liability, and "warranty," as might be expected, has
introduced a note of confusion. Outside of California, four courts 56
153 See Note, 19 RuToEas L. BEv. 715 (1965). A subsidiary question, of which no
discussion has been found anywhere, is whether the damages would be determined by
the tort, or "out-of-pocket" measure of the difference between the price paid and the
value received, or the contract, or "benefit-of-the-bargain" measure of the difference
between the value promised and the value received.
154 Some of this, at least, is said by Traynor, C.J., in Seely v. White Motor Co.,
63 Cal. 2d 9, 17-18, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23, 403 P.2d 145, 151 (1965).
'55 Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956);
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284
(Sup. Ct. 1955). Cf. Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp.
376 (D. Mass. 1956); Lucette Originals, Inc. v. General Cotton Converters, Inc., 8
App. Div. 2d 102, 185 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1959); Donovan Constr. Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1955); Polden Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. Zell Elec. Mfg.
Co., 1 Misc. 2d 1016, 156 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957); A.J.P. Contracting Corp.
v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 171 Misc. 157, 11 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1939),
aff'd mem. 258 App. Div. 747, 15 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1939), aff'd mem. 283 N.Y. 692, 28
N.E.2d 412 (1940).
156 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Lang
v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); see Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc.,
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have found the strict liability, without much discussion, and four1',
have refused to find it.
The question arose in California in Seely v. White Motor Co.,15 8
where a truck made by the defendant and purchased by the plaintiff
from a dealer proved to be defective and of inferior value. Chief Jus-
tice Traynor found liability on an express warranty made to the con-
sumer,:" 9 but on the basis of some of the arguments outlined above was
unwilling to extend the strict liability in tort to the loss on the bargain.
Justice Peters alone voiced vigorous disagreement, contending that
the policy underlying the strict liability called for the inclusion of
pecuniary loss as well as physical harm, that there was no basic differ-
ence in the nature of the damages, and that a "defective" product
should be regarded as the same thing as an "unmerchantable" one.
Although there are commentators who have agreed with this, 60 the
issue appears to have been settled in California as to loss on the bar-
gain. It is, however, by no means clear, notwithstanding the broad
language of Chief Justice Traynor as to "economic loss," that the ques-
tion has been determined as to other forms of pecuniary damage of a
consequential character.
Abnormal Use
The negligence cases 61 have made it clear that the seller is en-
titled to expect a normal use of his product, and is not to be held re-
137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. App. 1962); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670
(1959).
157Dennis v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953);
Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 197 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio App. 1964), aff'd on other
grounds, 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965); Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502
(Ore. 1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); of. Kyker v.
General Motors Corp., 214 Tenn. 521, 381 S.W.2d 884 (1964).
1'8 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
159 See note 203 infra.160 Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966); Note, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 916 (1966).
161 Yecny v. Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 192, 26 Cal. Rptr. 402
(1962) (misuse of vaporizer); Waterman v. Liederman, 16 Cal. App. 2d 483, 60 P.2d
881, hearing denied per curiam, 62 P.2d 142 (1936) (wild driving on defective tire).
Accord, Odekirk v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 274 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1960) (hammers
struck together); McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959)
(casements for window frames used by workmen as ladders); Marker v. Universal Oil
Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957) (hot catalyst used in cold catalyst refining
unit); Walton v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951) (negligent crop-
dusting); Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (cleaning
fluid mixed with other chemical); Schfranek v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 54 F.2d 76
(S.D.N.Y. 1931) (wall decorating compound stirred with hand); Stevens v. Allis-
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sponsible for injuries resulting from an abnormal one. Since the ques-
tion is one of an unreasonably dangerous product, there is no reason
to doubt that the same conclusion will be carried over to the strict
liability. It has been held in California that there is no such liability
when a portable elevator is altered by the plaintiff's employer,162 or
when a drug sold to be administered under the directions of a physician
is used without them.es The warning and instructions accompanying
the product are important; and when a hair dye is used without a
patch test in disregard of such instructions, there is no strict liability.""
There are similar cases in other jurisdictions.
At the same time there are some relatively unusual uses of a prod-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940) (dangerous method of control-
ling powered agricultural machine); Moore v. Jefferson Distilling & Denaturing Co.,
169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930) (match lighted to examine oil drum); Cohagan v.
Laclede Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1958) (wire binder for wrapping steel used
as handle to lift bundle of steel with crane); Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 354 Mo. 1147, 193
S.W.2d 581 (1946) (grinding wheel subjected to side pressure); Dubbs v. Zak Bros.
Co., 38 Ohio App. 299, 175 N.E. 626 (1931) (wearing shoes that did not fit).
162 Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957); Martinez v. Nichols
Conveyor & Eng. Co., 243 A.C.A. 1002, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966) (employer altering
paper baler). Cf. Solomon v. Red River Lumber Co., 56 Cal. App. 742, 206 Pac. 498
(1922) (teacher modifying swing).
16a Magee v. Wyeth Labs., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963).
164 Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (1957). Cf. Cembrook
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 52, 41 Cal. IRptr. 492 (1965) (aspirin taken
in excessive quantities over a period of twenty-two years; express representations).
Accord, Kaspirowitz v. Schering Corp., 70 N.J. Super. 397, 175 A.2d 658 (App. Div.
1961) (drug sold and used without prescription); Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d
445 (3d Cir. 1946) (wire rope subjected to excessive strain); Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (heating unit installed without recom-
mended valve); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557
(1964) (opening bottle in wrong manner); Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1955) (sensitive cattle in contact with insecticide); Strahlendorf v. Walgreen
Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 114 N.W.2d 823 (1962) (toy airplane shot by one child at an-
other); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966) (water heater
installed without following instructions); Power Ski, Inc. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 188
So. 2d 13 (Fla. App. 1966) (substance for filling skis improperly compounded against
directions).
Accord, as to negligence: Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151
N.E.2d 263 (1958) (glass jar pried open with beer can opener); Taylor v. Jacobson,
336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1958) (hair dye used without patch test); Wood
Motor Car Co. v. Tobin, 120 N.J.L. 587, 1 A.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (antifreeze used
in violation of directions); Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18
N.E.2d 11 (1938) (dry cleaning fluid used in enclosed space); Landers v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 172 Ore. 116, 139 P.2d 788 (1943) (bleaching solution not diluted);
Bender v. William Cooper & Nephews, 323 Ill. App. 96, 55 N.E:2d 94 (1944) (dis-
infectant not diluted); E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 73
So. 2d 249 (1954) (soybean meal sold to processor who disregarded warning and used
it in preparing cattle feed).
uct, such as standing on a chair, 6 ' which the seller is required to
anticipate, and against which he is required at least to give warning;
and when such warning is not given, it has been held that the product
is unsafe, and in a real sense defective,16 and that there is strict liabil-
ity. It appears very probable, for example, that if a poisonous cleaning
fluid is supplied for household use, a failure to give warning of its
character, with instructions to keep it away from children, will result
in strict liability.167
Intervening Negligence
In the negligence cases the rule has developed that the failure of
an intervening party, such as a dealer or an employer, to discover and
remedy the defect in the product,68 or indeed any other foreseeable
negligence,'69 such as improper driving of an automobile with bad
165 Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857
(1951). Cf. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952) (cock-
tail robe worn in proximity to stove); Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962)
(dancing in hula skirt near a fire); McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E.2d 513
(1936) (cooking pork to inadequate extent believed to be sufficient); Holt v. Mann,
294 Mass. 21, 200 N.E. 403 (1936) (same); Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power
Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956) (tractor operated downhill at
fast speed, using engine compression as brake); Nathan v. Electriglas Corp., 37 N.J.
Super. 494, 117 A.2d 620 (App. Div. 1955) (testing heat-producing quality of electric
fixture); Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963) (manu-
facturer of steel truss knew of universal custom for steel workers to ride the load).
166 Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963);
Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
167 Cf. Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681
(1964).
168 Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961) (sub-
contractor, swimming pool); Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d
48 (1951) (failure of dealer to label); Rae v. California Equip. Co., 12 Cal. 2d 563,
86 P.2d 352 (1939) (failure to have hoist inspected and licensed). Accord, Boeing
Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator
Co., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958); Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.
1951); Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn.
390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929); Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E.
571 (1923); Gwyn v. Lucky City Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123, 113 S.E.2d 302 (1960).
169 Brooks v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 410, 329 P.2d 575 (1958)
(negligent operation of crane); Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Rogers Pattern & Alumi-
num Foundry, 73 Cal. App. 2d 442, 166 P.2d 401 (1946) (placing castings in molten
salt bath); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (sudden swerve
of driver to avoid collision); Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.
1956) (workman lighting match); Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed.
475 (D. Mich. 1918) (store customer negligently discharged air rifle at plaintiff);
Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958) (fellow servant dropped bottle
of nail polish remover).
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brakes, 170 will not relieve the seller of liability. Sometimes this has been
put as a matter of duty, sometimes as "proximate cause." At the same
time it has been held in several cases17 that when the intermediate
handler in fact discovers the danger, and nevertheless deliberately
passes on the product without a warning, the responsibility is usually
shifted to him, and the seller's liability is superseded. This in turn must
be qualified by the holdings in a few other cases, 172 that there are some
products so highly dangerous, and so utterly unsuited for their in-
tended use, that even such discovery of the danger and deliberate
failure to disclose will not relieve the seller.
There is every reason to expect that the same conclusions, in gen-
eral, will be reached when strict liability is in question.1" At this point,
however, there enters. the most extreme of all the decisions thus far
handed down on strict liability, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 74 in
California in 1964. The case held that the obligation of the manufac-
turer of an automobile to the ultimate user was such that it could not
delegate to its dealer responsibility for the final inspections, corrections
and adjustments necessary to make the car ready for use, and that it
could not escape the strict liability on the ground that the defect in
170 Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 575. See generally, as to foreseeable
intervening causes, Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 157 P.2d 372 (1945).
171Catfin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 Pac. 29 (1916) (gasoline sold
for kerosene); Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 59 P.2d 100 (1936) (em-
ployer using defective plank for scaffold); Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616,
140 S.W. 1047 (1911); see Kapp v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 57 F. Supp. 32
(E.D. Mich. 1944). Cf. Laughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181
N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962); Drazen v. Otis Elevator Co., 189 A.2d 693
(R.I. 1963); Nishida v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1957);
Trust Co. v. Lewis Auto Sales, 306 IM. App. 132, 28 N.E.2d 300 (1940); Ford Motor
Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946); Foster v. Ford Motor Co.,
139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 945 (1926).
172 Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal. 2d 310, 282 P.2d 12 (1955) (high
power cartridges used for shooting gallery); Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co., 271 Mass.
230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930) (inflammable combs for beauty shop); Clement v. Crosby
& Co., 148 Mich. 293, 111 N.W. 745 (1907) (inflammable stove polish); Kentucky
Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925) (explosive mix-
ture of gasoline and kerosene).
173 Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (failure of
dealer to discover defect does not relieve manufacturer); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto
Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (1960) (same); Jarnot v. Ford Motor
Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959) (same); Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
51 IM. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964), affirmed, 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965) (negligent failure to discover bad brakes does not relieve manufacturer). As to
intervening discovery of the danger, see Halpern v. Jad Constr. Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 675,
202 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
17461 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
the delivered car was caused by something that the dealer "did or
failed to do."175
The implications of the decision are as yet a bit uncertain. Any
idea that it might be concerned only with the somewhat peculiar rela-
tion between automobile manufacturers and their dealers disappears
in the light of a subsequent decision of a District Court of Appeal, 176
which applied the same rule to a concrete cutting machine in a case
where no vestige of an agency relation could be found. Probably the
decisions bear only upon the final "servicing" of products, 17 7 and do
not apply, for example, to further processing by another manufac-
turer,178 or to the corner grocer who discovers that a can of meat is
leaking and deliberately sells it. But as to such servicing, the rule ap-
parently laid down is that the maker is to be held to the strict liability
even where the dealer discovers the danger and fails to correct it, and
perhaps even where it is his active negligence that creates it in the
first instance.
Express Representations
The strict liability without privity may be enlarged by express
representations made by the seller to the consumer. This idea origi-
nated in 1932 with the Washington case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
where literature distributed by the maker of an automobile stated that
the glass in its cars was "shatter-proof," and the plaintiff was injured
when a stone struck his windshield and shattered it. In its first opin-
ion179 the court called the strict liability an express "warranty," but
on a second appeal it shifted its ground to one of innocent misrepre-
sentation, 8 which is a form of "fraud" recognized by a considerable
175 "It appears in the present case that Ford delegates the final steps in that process
to its authorized dealers. It does not deliver cars to its dealers that are ready to be
driven away by the ultimate purchasers but relies on its dealers to make the final in-
spections, corrections, and adjustments necessary to make the cars ready for use. Since
Ford, as the manufacturer of the completed product, cannot delegate its duty to have
its cars delivered to the ultimate purchaser free from dangerous defects, it cannot es-
cape liability on the ground that the defect in Vandermark's car may have been caused
by something one of its authorized dealers did or failed to do." Id. at 261, 37 Cal. Rptr.
at 899, 391 P.2d at 171 (1964).
176 Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964).
177 As to what this may include, see Milling, Henningsen and the Pre-Delivery
Inspection and Conditioning Schedule, 16 R-rmTEBs L. REV. 559 (1962).
178 Cf. Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958). See text supra
at notes 74-77.
179 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd on re-
hearing, 168 Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
180 "Since it was the duty of appellant to know that the representation made to
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number of courts in the direct sale of any kind of property."'1 The case
has been followed in a good many other jurisdictions,182 and apparently
is no longer questioned anywhere.8 3 Most of the other courts have
gone upon the basis of express warranty; but very lately the Tennessee
court, unwilling to overrule a decision184 that had refused to find a
"warranty" as to loss on the bargain, reverted to the ground of mis-
representation.'85 This seems clearly to be the preferable basis, since
"warranty" without a contract has been no more of a blessing in cases
of express language than where it is implied.
There are several California decisions, in which the strict liability
has been found as to statements made in advertising, 88 labels,'8 7 or
purchasers were true: otherwise, it should not have made them. If a person states as
true material facts susceptible of knowledge to one who relies and acts thereon to his
injury, if the representations are false, it is immaterial that he did not know they were
false, or that he believed them to be true.... The court charged the jury that 'there is
no proof of fraud in this case.' It has become almost axiomatic that false representations
including a sale or contract constitute fraud in law." Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179
Wash. 123, 128, 35 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1934).
181 See PnossEa, ToRTs § 102, at 724-28 (3d ed. 1964).
18 2 Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (watermelon seed);
Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952)
(washing powder); Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940)
(insecticide); Wise v. Hayes, 58 Wash. 2d 106, 361 P.2d 171 (1961) (same); Pritchard
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (cigarettes); Arfons v.
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958) (dynamite); Hamon
v. Digliani, 148 Con. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961) (detergent); Connolly v. Hagi, 24
Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963) (automobile); Spiegel v. Saks 34th Street, 43
Misc. 2d 1065, 252 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1964) (cosmetic); Inglis v. American Motors Corp.,
3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965) (automobile); Rogers v. Toni Home Per-
manent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) (permanent wave solution);
Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958)
(same); Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960) (tire);
Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) (automo-
bile); Brown v. Globe Labs., Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957) (sheep
vaccine); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d
399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (fabrics); Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d
Cir. 1946) (wire rope); Ein v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 173 F. Supp. 497 (N.D.
Ind. 1959) (tire).
183 Two early decisions rejecting the Baxter case, Racblin v. Libby-Owens-Ford
Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938), and Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d
889 (7th Cir. 1937), are now out of line with state law.
184 Kyker v. General Motors Corp., 214 Tenn. 521, 381 S.W.2d 884 (1964).
185 Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966). Accord, Cooper v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).
18 6 Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956)
(mattress); Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (1955)
("boned chicken"). Cf. Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal.
2d 713, 128 P.2d 522 (1942) (fraud).
187 Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., supra note 186; Lane v. C. A. Swanson &
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disseminated literature,' and of course in a document supplied to a
dealer to be passed on to the consumer. 8 ' All of them have talked ex-
press warranty; and even the Greenman'90 and Seely' cases, which
discarded the implied warranty in favor of strict liability in tort, con-
tinued to put the liability for express language on a warranty basis.
The limitations upon the rule seem to be fairly clear. The statement
must be one of fact, and more than mere sales talk or "puffing,"192 al-
though such general assertions as that a detergent is "kind to the
hands,"'9 3 or that a product is "Number 1" and "first class" 94 have been
found to carry implications of fact. It must be brought home to the
defendant; and a dealer, merely by passing on the manufacturer's
literature, does not necessarily adopt it as his own."' It must be di-
rected to the public, or at least intended to reach a class of persons
which includes the plaintiff,19 and a representation made to one per-
Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723, supra note 186; Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App.
2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (1948) (soap).
'
8 8 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1963) (combination power tool).
189 Rose v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 212 Cal. App. 2d 755, 28 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1963);
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965) (auto-
mobiles).
190 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1963).
19' Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
192Alexander v. Stone, 29 Cal. App. 488, 156 Pac. 998 (1916) ("first class");
W. J. Bush Co. v. Van Camp Sea Food Co., 55 Cal. App. 672, 203 Pac. 1026 (1921)
(peach kernel oil compared to olive oil); Blumer v. Rauer, 69 Cal. App. 195, 230 Pac.
964 (1924) (manure mixtures would double crop of grapes); Steen v. Southern Cal.
Supply Co., 74 Cal. App. 265, 239 Pac. 1098 (1925) (comparison with other products).
Accord, Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952); Topeka Mill & Elevator Co.
v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964 (1950); Brown v. Globe Labs., Inc., 165 Neb.
138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Ralston Purina Mills v. Iiams, 143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d
452 (1943); Maupin v. Nutrena Mills, 385 P.2d 504 (Okla. 1963).
1' Proctor [sic] & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d 157, 268
P.2d 199 (1954). Cf. Morris v. Fiat Motor Sales Co., 32 Cal. App. 315, 162 Pac. 663
(1916) (year model of car). Accord, Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo.
App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295
F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961); Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th
Cir. 1960); Arfons v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958);
Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn.
Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
194 Pacific Feed Co. v. Kennel, 63 Cal. App. 108, 218 Pac. 274 (1923). In Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963),
the statement that a power tool was "rugged" was held to be sufficient.
'95 Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
196In Odell v. Frueb, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 304 P.2d 45 (1956), a statement
made to agencies which directed the purchaser to buy was held to be sufficient. And
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son with no reason to expect that he will pass it on to another is not
enough.07 The plaintiff must have relied on the assertion, not neces-
sarily in making his purchase,198 but at least in making use of the
product;19 9 and in the absence of such reliance the representation can-
not be found to be a cause of his injury.200 Since the basis of the re-
covery is not that the defendant has sold the product, but that he has
voluntarily assumed responsibility for his assertion about it, and he
may obviously undertake responsibility for more than the safety of
the product, the cases in other jurisdictions2 1 have held rather con-
sistently202 that it extends to pecuniary loss, including loss on the bar-
gain; and with this the Seely case 203 in California has agreed.
in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Cavanaugh, 217 Cal. App. 2d 492, 32 Cal. Rptr.
144 (1963), a warranty to a building contract 6r was held to inure to the owner of the
building. In Hayman v. Shoemake, 203 Cal. App. 2d 140, 21 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1962),
and Southern California Enterprises v. D. N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750,
178 P.2d 785 (1947), a warranty to a plaintiff who bought from another was held to
be effective.
197 Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955);
Hermanson v. Hermanson, 19 Conn. Supp. 479, 117 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct. 1954); Barni
v. Kutner, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 550, 76 A.2d 801 (1950); Berger v. Standard Oil Co.,
126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907); Pearl v. William Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass. 529,
58 N.E.2d 825 (1945); Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E.
423 (1928); Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953);
Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell Co., 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1922); Senter v. B. F.
Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954). See Prosser, Misrepresentation and
Third Parties, 19 VA~N. L. REv. 231 (1966).
108 Cf. Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963),
and Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946), where the plaintiff was
not a purchaser at all.
199 See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145
(1965).
200 Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); Sears Roebuck
& Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941); Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co.,
238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W.2d 769 (1952). See also Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F.
Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954); Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170
P.2d 642 (1946).
201Posey v. Ford Motor Co., 128 So. 2d 149 (Fla. App. 1961); Beck v. Spindler,
256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St.
2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). Cf. Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla.
1953) (inferior crop grown from seed); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid
Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (garments made from
fabrics shrank).
202 Recovery has been denied only in Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d
385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960) (excessive consumption of gasoline and oil by automobile).
In Holz v. Coates Motor Co., 147 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1966), the plaintiff failed only
for lack of proof of the damages.
2o Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
Notice to the Seller
The requirement of the Uniform Sales Act,2 4 retained in a modified
form by the Uniform Commercial Code,20 5 that the buyer must give
notice to the seller of any breach of warranty within a reasonable time
after he knows or ought to know of it, has clearly been intended to
protect the seller against unduly delayed claims for damages .20  As
applied to commercial transactions, it has been a sound rule, and buy-
ers usually have been quite competent to protect themselves, and have
given prompt notice as a matter of course. Where there is personal
injury, and there is a remote seller, it has proved to be something of
a booby-trap for the unwary. The injured consumer is seldom "Steeped
in the business practice which justifies the rule,"20 7 and at least until
he has had legal advice it will not occur to him to give notice to one
with whom he has had no dealings.20 8
When "warranty" was extended beyond direct sales, it was at first
assumed that the notice requirement, along with the rest of the Sales
Act, must apply. It was treated as effective in California, although
there were only two decisions 20 in which it prevented recovery. There
was a marked attempt, however, to protect the injured consumer by
holding that under the circumstances long delayed notice could be
found to be timely;210 and in one federal case purporting to apply
California law it was held that notice given even after suit was brought
204 UnIoP- SALEs Acr § 49, supra, note 50. See Note, 51 CAinF. L. REv. 586
(1963). This has frequently been applied to cases of direct sales. Davidson v. Herring-
Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 874, 280 P.2d 549 (1955); Vogel v. Thrifty
Drug Co., 43 Cal. 2d 184, 272 P.2d 1 (1954); Silvers v. Broadway Dep't Stores, 35
F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d 869, 280 P.2d 235
(1954) (notice given); McAnulty v. Lema, 200 Cal. App. 2d 126, 19 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1962) (notice given).
205 U o no ,c Comwzacmz CoDE § 2-607 (3).
206 Learned Hand, J., in American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emer-
gency Fleet Corp., 7 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925).
207 James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. PErv. 44, 192, 197 (1955).
208 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897 (1963).
209In Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (1957), and Title
Ins. & Trust Co. v. Affiliated Gas Equip., Inc., 191 Cal. App. 2d 318, 12 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1961), it was held that the notice must be pleaded. In Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing
Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961); Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
219 Cal. App. 2d 196, 33 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1963); and Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress
Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956), it was assumed that notice was re-
quired, but timely notice was found to have been given.
210 Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948); and see the last three
cases in the preceding note. Accord, Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962);
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961); Bonker v.
Ingersoll Prods. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955).
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could be found to be within a reasonable time.2  As early as 1923,
however, an attack began in New York upon the notice requirement
itself, with decisions holding that it was not intended to apply to per-
sonal injuries, and that it was against public policy so to apply it.2 12
In 1957 the Washington court, which has been in the vanguard of all
this more than once, met the issue head-on by holding that the Sales
Act did not require that notice be given to one with whom the plaintiff
has had no dealings.213 With this several other courts have now
agreed.214
In the Greenman case21 the issue was finally determined in Cali-
fornia. Justice Traynor threw the requirement of notice out of the
window, both as to express warranties in the defendant's brochure and
as to strict liability in tort, saying that it was "not an appropriate one
for the court to adopt in actions by injured consumers against manu-
facturers with whom they have not dealt."1 ' A District Court of
Appeal has applied this to a claim for pecuniary loss against a remote
party on an express warranty.2 17 In the Vandermark case218 the supreme
court went even further, and held that there need not be notice of
personal injury to the retail dealer from whom the plaintiff had bought
his automobile, because the basis of the liability was not warranty, but
strict liability in tort. The question remains open as to notice to the
immediate seller of a claim for pecuniary loss, which remains in this
state a matter of express warranty, and does not involve strict liability
2 11 Hampton v. Gebbardes Chili Powder Co., 294 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1961). This
ignored the contrary holding in Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130
(1957).
212 Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y. Supp. 121
(1923); Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1943).
Cf. Wright-Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E.2d 713 (1956).2 13 LaHue v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
214 Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (Vermont law);
Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Ill. 1964); Chapman v.
Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd on other grounds, Brown v. Chapman,
304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Ruderman v. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23
Conn. Supp. 416, 184 A.2d 63 (C.P. 1962); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375
Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Dispangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wash. 2d 720, 393
P.2d 936 (1964); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965).
2 15 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1963).
21659 Cal. 2d at 61, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900.
217 Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Cavanaugh, 217 Cal. App. 2d 492, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 144 (1963).
218 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d
168 (1964).
in tort.2 19 If the courts of this state are to do away with the notice
requirement of the Commercial Code, they may be hard put to find
an explanation as to why it does not apply to the warranty,2 0 and some
rather remarkable gymnastics may be called for. It would, however,
be a venturesome matter to hazard any prediction that this will not
occur.
Disclaimers
The Uniform Sales Act2 21 provided that any warranty, express or
implied, could be disclaimed by the seller at the time of the sale; and
this has been retained in a somewhat modified form in the Uniform
Commercial Code.222 Commercially a disclaimer may not be at all an
unreasonable thing, particularly where the seller does not know the
quality of what he is selling, and the buyer is willing to take his
chances. "As is" sales are common and reasonable enough. Even so a
rather dangerous power of abuse is placed in the hands of the seller,
which the courts have done what they could to obviate, either by con-
struing away the disclaimer,223 or by finding that it was not brought
219 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
220 The only possibility which occurs to the writer would be to hold, in accord with
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966), that the express "warranty"e
is in reality a matter of strict liability for innocent misrepresentation.
221 U JNioPjv SALEs AcT § 71. The purpose of the provision is discussed in Franck
v. J. J. Sugarman-Rudolph Co., 40 Cal. 2d 81, 251 P.2d 949 (1952). It has frequently
been given effect in direct sales resulting in pecuniary loss. Sutter v. Associated Seed
Growers, 31 Cal. App. 2d 543, 88 P.2d 144 (1939); William A. Davis Co. v. Bertrand
Seed Co., 94 Cal. App. 281, 271 Pac. 123 (1928); Couts v. Sperry Flour Co., 85 Cal.
App. 156, 259 Pac. 108 (1927); Intrastate Credit Service, Inc. v. Pervo Paint Co., 236
Cal. App. 2d 547, 46 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1965); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft
Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965); Donnelly v. Governair Corp., 145
F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
2 2 2 UrnoPR CowmMcIA CODE § 2-316.
2 2 3 Lindberg v. Coutches, 167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (1959) ("as is"
ineffective as to mechanical defects under particular contract); Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-
Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122 (1954) (does not exclude liability
for negligence); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954)
(does not exclude warranty of merchantable quality); Ferguson v. Koch, 204 Cal. 342,
268 Pac. 342 (1928) ("as is" does not exclude liability for express representations);
Inner Shoe Tire Co. v. Tondro, 83 Cal. App. 689, 257 Pac. 211 (1927) (construed
strictly against seller; not applicable to particular sale); Mulder v. Casho, 61 Cal. 2d
633, 39 Cal. Rptr. 705, 394 P.2d 545 (1964) ("as is" does not avoid statutory require-
ment); Guntert & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Thermoid Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 771, 31 Cal.
Bptr. 99 (1963) (ineffective against subsequent express warranty); cf. Lingsch v.
Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963) (realty; ineffective against
fraud).
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home to the buyer,224 or in an extreme case by refusing to enforce it
as a matter of "natural justice and good morals."2
It is another matter to say that a consumer who buys at retail is to
be bound by a disclaimer which he has never seen, and to which he
could certainly not have agreed if he had known of it, but which
defeats a duty imposed by the policy of the law for his protection. And
when the disclaimer is handed to him with the product, all reality of
consent to accede to it is lacking. Obviously if the opportunity is to
remain open to the seller to frustrate that policy completely by adding
such words as "Not Warranted in Any Way" to the label on the pack-
age, it may be anticipated that there will be those who take advantage
of it.
It was to be expected that this would not be tolerated. In the
leading Henningsen case22 the New Jersey court invalidated the
standard automobile "warranty," in itself a disclaimer of almost all
liability of any consequence, as a contract of adhesion 227 not in reality
involving any bargaining or freedom of consent, as unfair to the con-
sumer, and as against the policy of the law in promoting human safety.
Other courts have since agreed.228 The elimination of "warranty," and
the recognition of outright strict liability in tort229 provided a way
2 24 Guntert & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Thermoid Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 771, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 99 (1963) (fine print); India Paint & Lacquer Co. v. United Steel Prods. Corp.,
123 Cal. App. 2d 597, 267 P.2d 408 (1954) (made after contract completed).225 Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct 1939). Cf. as to the policy involved Tunkl v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).226 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, (1960).
Actually this was not the first such decision. In Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co., 122
Wash. 620, 624, 211 Pac. 748, 750 (1922), it had been held that "since a specific
warranty as to personal property cannot run with the thing itself, we see no reason
why a disclaimer of warranty should run with the thing." Cf. Sokoloski v. Splann,
311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E.2d 874 (1942). In Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super.
422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959), an automobile manufacturer's disclaimer was rejected
without discussion.
227 See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 CoLU-m. L. B-v. 629 (1943); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of
Laws, 53 COLum. L. Buy. 1072, 1089 (1953).
228 Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 101 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d
149 (9th Cir. 1962); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252
Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134
N.W.2d 730 (1965); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965);
General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960);
McMillen Feeds, Inc. of Texas v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966);
Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 347 (II. App. 1966). Contra, Rozen v.
Chrysler Corp., 142 So. 2d 735 (Fla. App. 1962).
229 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1963).
around the statutes, and afforded an additional justification for refusing
to enforce the manufacturer's disclaimer. In the Vandermark case23"
the California court applied this even to a claim for personal injury
on a direct sale from a dealer to the plaintiff. Again the question
remains open as to pecuniary loss,2 31 which in this state is still a matter
of warranty, and not strict liability in tort. There is language in the
Seely case232 which indicates that where physical safety ls not involved
a sale "as is," for example of a used automobile, will still be effective.
On the basis of nothing more than an opinion that it should be, and
that no overriding policy should prevent a seller from refusing to
accept responsibility for the value of what he sells, it might be pre-
dicted that this will be the conclusion.
Contributory Negligence
The language of the courts is in a state of flat contradiction as to
whether contributory negligence is a defense to strict liability for a
defective product. Nearly all of the decisions have involved warranty,
either upon a direct sale or without privity. It has been said many times
that contributory negligence is never a defense to an action for breach
of warranty. It has been said more often that it is always a defense.
The confusion, however, is a superficial one of words and definition
only, and is merely part of the general murk that has surrounded
"warranty." If the substance of the cases is looked to, rather than their
language, they fall into an entirely consistent pattern.
If the plaintiffs negligence consists only in a failure to discover the
danger involved in the product,3 3 or to take precautions against the
230 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr, 896, 391 P.2d
168 (1964). See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95,
47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
231 See text accompanying notes 158-160 supra.
232 "It was only because the defendant in that case [Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)] marketed the rug as Grade #1 that the court
was justified in holding that the rug was defective. Had the manufacturer not so de-
scribed the rug, but sold it 'as is,' or sold it disclaiming any guarantee of quality, there
would have been no basis for recovery in that case. Only if someone had been injured
because the rug was unsafe for use would there have been any basis for strict liability
in tort." Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 17-18, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23, 403 P.2d
145, 151 (1965).
233Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d .479 (3d Cir. 1965)
(smoking cigarettes in ignorance of danger of lung cancer); Simmons v. Wichita Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957) (failure to discover matches in
beverage); Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962), affrming 198 F. Supp.
78 (D. Hawaii 1961) (dancing in hula skirt near a fire); Brockett v. Harrell Bros.,
206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965) (failure to discover shot in ham); Challis v.
[Vol 18THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
November, 1966] STRICT LIABILITY TO THE CONSUMER 49
possibility of its existence, as in the case of negligent driving on a
defective tire,234 it is clearly no defense to the strict liability. Thus if
the plaintiff drinks a beverage without discovering that it is full of
broken glass, 23 5 his failure to exercise due care in doing so does not
relieve the defendant. On the other hand, the kind of negligence which
consists of proceeding voluntarily to encounter a known unreasonable
danger, and which overlaps the defense of assumption of risk, will
relieve the defendant on either ground.236 If the plaintiff continues to
operate a washing machine after discovery that the wringer is danger-
Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933) (poisoned flour; details not alleged, but
quite unlikely that plaintiff discovered it); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super.
422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959) (failure to discover defect in kingpin of truck); Shamrock
Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.E.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (failure to test
kerosene).
2 4 Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Hansen v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960). Accord, Bahlman v. Hud-
son Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) (express warranty of top of
car, negligent driving).
235 Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786
(1963).2 36 Dallison v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962) (smoking in
bed); Hitchcock v. Hunt, 28 Conn. 343 (1859) (using barrels known to be leaking);
Tomita v. Johnson, 49 Idaho 643, 290 Pac. 395 (1930) (planting seeds known to be
the wrong kind); Cedar Rapids & I.C. Ry. & Light Co. v. Sprague Elec. Co., 203 Ill.
App. 424, aff'd, 280 Ill. 386, 117 N.E. 461 (1917) (use of electric shovel after
discovery of defect); Frier v. Proctor [sic] & Gamble Distrib. Co., 173 Kan. 733, 252
P.2d 850 (1953) (use of detergent with knowledge it was injuring hands); Topeka
Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964 (1950) (feeding chickens
with knowledge feed was injuring them); Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963) (drinking beverage known to be full of broken
glass); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964)
(opening bottle in wrong manner); Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d
861 (1955) (continued use of oil burner known not to be functioning properly);
Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952) (use
of bags known to be defective); Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 235 Mo. App. 679,
147 S.W.2d 124 (1941) (refrigerated meat showcase used after discovery of unfitness);
Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 NJ. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965) (opening glass tooth-
brush container with pressure); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45
N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (driving truck knowing brakes to be bad); Eisenbach v.
Gimbel Bros., 281 N.Y. 474, 24 N.E.2d 131 (1939) (improper cooking of pork by
experienced cook); Bates v. Fish Bros. Wagon Co., 50 App. Div. 38, 63 N.Y.S. 649
(1900) (use of heating apparatus after discovery of the defect); Bruce v. Fiss, Doerr &
Carroll Horse Co., 47 App. Div. 273, 62 N.Y.S. 96 (1900) (use of horse discovered to
to be dangerous); Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E.2d 668 (1941)
(eating biscuits with foul odor); Pauls Valley Milling Co. v. Gabbert, 182 Okla. 500,
78 P.2d 685 (1938) (planting seeds known to be the wrong kind); McCormick Har-
vesting Mach. Co. v. Nicholson, 17 Pa. Super. 188 (1901) (use of rope after it had
broken); Tex-Tube, Inc. v. Rockwall Corp., 379 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
(failure to shut off pump after discovery of leak in pipe).
ously defective, 287 or negligently drives on a tire that he knows to be
unsafe28 he cannot recover. These rules are quite consistent with those
worked out as to other strict liability for animals and for abnormally
dangerous activities. 3 9
The few California cases support this distinction, denying the
recovery where the plaintiff was aware of the danger,240 and allowing
it where he was not.241 There is nothing in the outright strict liability
in tort to call for any change in the rules as to warranty.242 It is always
possible, however, that the plaintiff's negligence may amount to an
abnormal use of the product, and so relieves the defendant, not on the
basis of contributory negligence, but on that of proximate cause.243
Proof
The proof of strict liability for a defective product does not appear
to differ in any significant respect from the proof of negligence.24 In a
negligence case the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing three
things. The first is that he has been injured by the product. This is no
less true of strict liability. It is not enough to show that the plaintiff ate
the defendant's food and became ill, so long as he ate other things, and
237 Gutelius v. General Elec. Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 455, 99 P.2d 682 (1940).
238 Youtz v. Thompson Tire Co., 46 Cal. App. 2d 672, 116 P.2d 636 (1941).
239 See PeossER, ToRTs § 78, at 539-40 (3d ed. 1964).
240 Gutelius v. General Elec. Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 455, 99 P.2d 636 (1941); Youtz
v. Thompson Tire Co., 46 Cal. App. 2d 672, 116 P.2d 682 (1940); Martinez v. Nichols
Conveyor & Eng. Co., 243 A.C.A. 1002, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966) (use of paper baler
with knowledge of defect).
241 Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963)
(use of surface preparer in ignorance of danger of combustion from distant flame);
Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963) (handling
milk bottle without knowledge of defect); Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568,
26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962) (eating candy bar without discovering it was wormy).
242 Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., supra note 241.
248 A good case on this is Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir.
1964), where defendant withdrew the defense of contributory negligence because it
could not prove which decedent was flying the plane. It was held, nevertheless, that
the plaintiff must sustain his burden of showing that the crash was due to a defect in
the plane rather than to negligent flying. A similar case is Preston v. Up-Right, Inc.,
52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Cal. App. 1966). See also Dallison v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 313
F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1963) (smoking in bed); Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F.
Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958) (plaintiff's storage of high-moisture content corn in a bin
held to be the proximate cause of damage to the corn); Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus,
Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d 11 (1938) (carbon tetrachloride used in enclosed space);
Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964) (opening
bottle in wrong manner).
244 Particularly helpful on this are Keeton, Products Liability Proof of the Manu-
facturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. Rav. 675 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-Problems
Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965).
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others who ate the food were not made ill.245 The second is that the
injury occurred because the product was defective; and this also is no
less true of strict liability. Proof that an airplane has crashed does not
make out a case against the manufacturer, where there is no evidence
to show that it was not due to negligent flying.2"5 The third is that the
defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant; and
this again is no less true of strict liability. When meat has been exposed
to the air for a considerable time by a dealer, and might have spoiled
in the process, the burden of proof against the original supplier of the
meat is not sustained.247 The elimination of negligence as the basis of
recovery does not relieve the plaintiff of the necessity of making out his
case as to all of these three elements.
Once the plaintiff has proved all three, all trial lawyers know that
the plaintiff usually recovers against the manufacturer for negligence.
This is because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitr 24 ordinarily allows the
case to go to the jury, and the jury is permitted to, and usually does,
infer that some negligence of the defendant was responsible for the
defect. There have been, it is true, occasional cases in which the court
has refused to permit the inference to be drawn,249 or the defendant's
245 Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16 Wash. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 740 (1942). Cf.
Landers v. Safeway Stores, 172 Ore. 116, 139 P.2d 788 (1943) (bleaching compound).24GHurley v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1966); Swain v. Boeing
Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964). Cf. Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark.
534, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127
N.W.2d 557 (1964); Scientific Supply Co. v. Zelinger, 139 Colo. 568, 341 P.2d 897
(1959); Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d'53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
247 TifRn v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 18 IM. 2d 48, 162 N.W.2d 406 (1959); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934).
248 See Prosser, Re Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 183 (1949).
For applications of the principle to products liability, see Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.
v. De Lape, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1940) (explosive cigarette); Woodworkers Tool
Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1951) (disintegration of panel hood on shaper);
Vandagriff v. J. C. Penney Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 579, 39 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1964) (escala-
tor); Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) (exploding
bottle); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949) (same);
Hoffing v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948); Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (same); McClelland v.
Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 698, 207 P.2d 591 (1949) (same); Dryden v. Con-
tinental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938) (glass in bread). The require-
ments for res ipsa loquitur in a products liability case are stated in Reynolds v. Natural
Gas Equip., Inc., 184 Cal. App. 2d 724, 7 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1960).
249 See, for example, Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957)
(collapse of elevator, defect not discoverable); Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd.,
46 Cal. 2d 190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956) (cement, danger not preventable); H. J. Heinz
Co. v. Duke, 196 Ark. 180, 116 S.W.2d 1039 (1938); Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Il.
518, 45 N.E. 253 (1896); O'Brien v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 255 Mass. 553, 152 N.E. 57
(1926); Crocker v. Baltimore Dairy Lunch Co., 214 Mass. 177, 100 N.E. 1078 (1913).
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proof of due care has been found to be so conclusive as to call for a
directed verdict,250 and even instances in which the jury has found
that there is no negligence.2 5 1 Strict liability eliminates such cases; but
they represent such a minor fraction of the total number that the alarm
voiced by a good many manufacturers over the prospect of a vast in-
crease in liability appears to be quite unfounded.
The difficult problems are those of proof by circumstantial evi-
dence, particularly as to the last two elements. Strictly speaking, and
since proof of negligence is not in issue, res ipsa loquitur has no
application to strict liability; but the inferences which are the core
of the doctrine remain, and are no less applicable.252 The plaintiff is
not required to exclude all other possibilities, and so prove his case
beyond a reasonable doubt. As on other issues in civil cases, it is
enough that he makes out a preponderance of probability. It is enough
that the court cannot say that reasonable men on the jury could not
find it more likely than not that the fact is true.58
The mere fact of an accident, as where an automobile goes into the
ditch, does not make out a case that the product was defective; 25" nor
250 See, for example, Nichols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1929);
Swenson v. Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289, 236 N.W. 310 (1931); Smith v. Salem
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942).
251 See, for example, Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 93
N.W.2d 467 (1959).
252 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110
N.W.2d 449 (1961). In Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 324 P.2d 583
(1958), the court said that res ipsa loquitur had no application to an action for breach
of warranty. In Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d
331 (1956), the court applied it to a case of express warranty.
2 5 3 Vandagriff v. J. C. Penney Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 579, 39 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1964);
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
254 Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc., 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622 (1962)
(wheel broke); Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 365 Mo. 625, 285 S.W.2d 585
(1955) (fact that combine did not give satisfactory service does not prove a defect);
Remsberg v. Hackney Mfg. Co., 174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792 (1917) (same as to plow).
As to negligence, compare McNamara v. American Motors Corp., 247 F.2d 445
(5th Cir. 1957) (backing car shot forward); Smith v. General Motors Corp., 227 F.2d
210 (5th Cir. 1955) (car leaving road, testimony as to possibility of defect); Jastrzemb-
ski v. General Motors Corp., 100 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (car starting into
motion); O'Hara v. General Motors Corp., 35 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Mich. 1940) (car
leaving road); Herrin's Adm'x v. Jackson, 265 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1954) (door of car
coming open); Glinski v. Szylling, 358 Mich. 182, 99 N.W.2d 637 (1959) (prior vibra-
tion in steering wheel not enough); Shramek v. General Motors Corp., 216 N.E.2d 244
(Ill. App. 1966) (blowout); Williams v. U.S. Royal Tires, 101 So. 2d 488 (La. App.
1958) (same); Haas v. Buick Motor Div., 20 Ill. App. 2d 448, 156 N.E.2d 263 (1959)
(fire in car); Kramer v. R. M. Hollingshead Corp., 5 N.J. 386, 75 A.2d 861 (1950)
(motor exploded while plaintiff pouring in solvent); Ayers v. Amatucci, 206 Okla. 366,
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does the fact that it is found in a defective condition after the event,
when it appears equally likely that it was caused by the accident
itself.255 The addition of other facts, tending to show that the defect
existed before the accident,256 may make out a case, and so may expert
testimony.257 So likewise may proof that other similar products made
by the defendant met with similar misfortunes, 258 or the elimination
of other causes by satisfactory evidence.259 In addition, there are some
243 P.2d 716 (1952) (leakage of gasoline); Kimmey v. General Motors Corp., 262
S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (fire while plaintiff was filling gasoline tank);
Price v. Ashby's, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 54, 354 P.2d 1064 (1960) (car leaving road);
Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., 196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938) (leakage of gasoline).
Cf. Rexall Drug Co. v. Nehill, 276 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1960) (loss of hair after use
of home permanent wave solution).
255Davis v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 196 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1961)
(tread separated from tire after crash); Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 212 F.2d 805
(6th Cir. 1954) (steering wheel of tractor off of shaft); General Motors Corp. v.
Wolverine Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1958) (wheel off of car); Hupp Motor Car
Corp. v. Wadsworth, 113 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1940) (tire deflated); Fisher v. Sheppard,
366 Pa. 347, 77 A.2d 417 (1951) (broken sleeve in differential); Klein v. Beeten, 169
Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736 (1919) (tire blown out). Cf. Hill v. Mathews Paint Co., 149
Cal. App. 2d 714, 308 P.2d 865 (1957) (fire might have been due to sparks).
256 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (new
car veered suddenly from road without fault of driver). Accord, Jones v. Burgermeister
Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961) ("pronounced abrasion
or scuff mark at the lower part of the bottle"); Le Blanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346 Mass.
225, 191 N.E.2d 301 (1963) (car went into gear with shift lever in neutral); M. Dietz
& Sons v. Miller, 43 N.J. Super. 334, 128 A.2d 719 (1957) (brake failure after car
driven only fifty miles); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252
Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961) (localized smell of burning); Clark v. Zuzich
Truck Lines, 344 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. App. 1961) (car out of control before it left the
road); Knapp v. Willys-Ardmore, Inc., 174 Pa. Super. 90, 100 A.2d 105 (1958) (broken
tie rod; witness saw front wheel turn sharply to the right).
257 Spolter v. Four-Wheel Brake Service Co., 99 Cal. App. 2d 690, 222 P.2d 307
(1950) (rear wheel came off of car eight days after defendant had replaced it); Kuzma
v. United States Rubber Co., 323 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963) (disintegration of grinding
wheel); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964)
(automobile wrecked); Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. App. 1963)
(brake failure); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc. 252 Iowa 1289,
110 N.W.2d 449 (fire in automobile); Clark v. Zuzich Truck Lines, 344 S.W.2d 304
(Mo. App. 1961) (car out of control). Cf. Buffums' v. City of Long Beach, 111 Cal.
App. 327, 295 P.2d 540 (1931) (water main broke); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (exploding bottle); Hoffing v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948) (same); Cordon v. Aztec Brewing Co.,
33 Cal. 2d 514, 202 P.2d 522 (1949) (same).258Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926);
Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 S.C. 383, 126 S.E.2d 178 (1962); cf.
Ashkenazi v. Nehi Bottling Co., 217 N.C. 552, 8 S.E.2d 818 (1940).
2 59 Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945); Patterson
v. George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501, 370 P.2d 116 (1962).
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accidents, as where a beverage bottle explodes 2°0 or even breaks"0 1
while it is being handled normally, as to which there is human experi-
ence that they do not ordinarily occur without a defect. As in the cases
of res ipsa loquitur, the experience will give rise to the inference, and
it may be sufficient to sustain the plaintiffs burden of proof.
Tracing the defect in the product into the hands of the defendant
confronts the plaintiff with greater difficulties. There is first of all the
question of lapse of time and long continued use. This in itself will
never prevent recovery where there is satisfactory proof of an original
defect;2 2 but when there is no such definite evidence, and it is only
a matter of inference from the fact that something broke or gave way,
the continued use usually prevents the inference that more probably
than not the product was defective when it was sold.0 3 The seller
certainly does not undertake to provide a product that will never
wear out.2 4 In common with a few other jurisdictions, 2 5 California
260 Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952); Vallis v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961); Jones
v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961);
McClelland v. Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 698, 207 P.2d 591 (1949).261 Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963)
(milk bottle broke shortly after delivery under normal handling).
262Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); Pryor v. Lee C. Moore
Corp., 262 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1958) (fifteen years); International Derrick & Equip.
Co. v. Croix, 241 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1957) (seven years); Fredericks v. American
Export Lines, 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1955) (2y years); Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas,
73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934) (seven years); Hartleib v. General Motors Corp., 10 F.R.D.
380 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (two or three years); Darling v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal.
App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959) (three years); Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp.,
26 N.J. Super. 295, 97 A.2d 699 (1953) (three years).
263Jabukowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964);
Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962) (both as to strict
liability). Accord, as to negligence: United States Rubber Co. v. Bauer, 319 F.2d 463
(8th Cir. 1963); Solomon v. White Motor Co., 153 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Pa. 1957);
Sterchi Bros. Stores v. Castleberry, 28 Ala. App. 281, 182 So. 471 (1938); Kapp v.
Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962); Gorman v. Murphy Diesel
Co., 42 Del. (3 Terry) 149, 29 A.2d 145 (1942); Hofstedt v. International Harvester
Co., 256 Minn. 453, 98 N.W.2d 808 (1959); Auld v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 261 App.
Div. 918, 25 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1941), affd mem. 288 N.Y. 515, 41 N.E.2d 927 (1941);
Ayers v. Amatucci, 206 Okla. 366, 243 P.2d 716 (1952); D'Allesandro v. Edgar Murray
Supply Co., 185 So. 2d 34 (La. App. 1966).
264 Gomez v. E. W. Bliss Co., 27 Misc. 2d 649, 211 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
Jabukowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 263; Add v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., supra note 263. Hence it is error to exclude the evidence of wear and tear. Jones v.
Johnston Testers, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 2d 162, 281 P.2d 602 (1955).
265 Carney v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962) (stepladder);
Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951) (carbon particles
deposited in refrigerator); Parker v. Ford Motor Co., 296 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1956) (axle
housing of truck).
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has drawn a distinction between moving and stationary parts, which
are not so likely to fail with wear, and has permitted the inference in
the case of the latter. 6
With continued use eliminated as an obstacle, the plaintiff must
further eliminate his own improper conduct as an equally probable
cause of his injury.6 7 When he has done this, and has accounted for
other possible causes, he has made out a sufficient case of strict liability
for the defect against the dealer who has last sold the product. But the
very presence of the latter in the picture means that he too must be
eliminated before the case is established against the manufacturer.
When on the evidence it appears equally probable that the defect has
developed in the hands of the dealer, the plaintiff has not made out
a case of strict liability, or even negligence, against any prior party.2 68
This has meant, in a good many cases, that when a beverage bottle
breaks or explodes the case against the manufacturer is not established
until the intermediate handling has been accounted for.269 There need
not be conclusive proof, and only enough is required to permit a find-
ing of the greater probability.2 70 Since the plaintiff nearly always finds
it difficult to obtain evidence as to what has happened to the bottle
along the way, the courts have been quite lenient in finding the evi-
dence sufficient. He is not required to do the impossible by accounting
for every moment of the bottle's existence since it left the bottling
plant;271 and it is enough that he produces sufflcient evidence of careful
266 Darling v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959)
(inspection cover on deck plate of bulldozer broke after three years).
207 Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 614, 140 P.2d 369 (1943).
268 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (insecti-
cide); Tiffin v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 181 III. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959) (opened
meat); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934) (same);
Sundet v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 139 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. 1966) (cartridges,
several handlers); Huggins v. John Morrell & Co., 176 Ohio St. 171, 198 N.E.2d 448
(1964) (explosion of pickled pig's feet, several intermediate handlers); Krupar v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954) (needle in cake of soap).
2609 Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958); Miller v.
Schlitz Brewing Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d 109, 297 P.2d 1024 (1956); Cunningham v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 106, 198 P.2d 333 (1948); Gerber v. Faber,
54 Cal. App. 2d 674, 129 P.2d 485 (1942); Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 614,
140 P.2d 369 (1943).
27o Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Gordon
v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949); Honea v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944).
271 Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 101 Ga. App. 166, 112 S.E.2d 811,
af'd, 216 Ga. 61, 114 S.E.2d 517 (1960); Zarling v. La Salle Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
2 Wis. 2d 596, 87 N.W.2d 263 (1958).
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handling in general, and of the absence of unusual incidents, to permit
reasonable men to draw the conclusion. 72
If the product reaches the plaintiff in a sealed container, with the
defect on the inside, the inference against the manufacturer is much
more easily drawn, and may even be conclusive .27 The foreign object
in the bottled beverage is the typical case.274 Negligence on the part of
any intermediate handler is almost necessarily ruled out. There may
still be the possibility of intentional tampering; and there are decisions
which have held that the plaintiff must still disprove it,275 particularly
where the bottle has been exposed to meddling by irresponsible
persons, 270 or a charged beverage is found to be "flat" when it is
opened. But in the absence of any such special reason to look for
it, the considerable majority of the later cases have held that inten-
tional tampering is so unusual, and so unlikely, that the probabilities
are against it, and the plaintiff is not required to eliminate the pos-
sibility.2 7 8
272 Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949); McClelland
v. Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 698, 207 P.2d 591 (1949); Hoffing v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Ryan v. Adam Scheidt Brewing Co., 197
F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1952); Groves v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1949);
Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Crow, 200 Tenn. 161, 291 S.W.2d 589 (1956).
The fact that, the product has only been out of the defendant's hands for a short
time is important evidence against him. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d
436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952); Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 814 (1963).
273Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938) (glass
baked in bread).
274 Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953);
Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952);
Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 1954); Manzoni v.
Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961); Tafoya v. Las
Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955); Keller v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 214 Ore. 654, 330 P.2d 346 (1958).
275 Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byme, 258 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1953); Coca-
Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721 (1942); Jordan v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 117 Utah 578, 218 P.2d 660 (1950).
276 Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling Co., 343 I1. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164
(1951); Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. App. 1955). Cf.
Cunningham v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 106, 198 P.2d 333 (1948)
(bottle exploded after being exposed in a vending machine).
277 Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 I1. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d
442 (1956).
278 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958); Miami
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958); Le Blanc v. Louisiana
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 191, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Keller v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 214 Ore. 654, 330 P.2d 346 (1958); see Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling
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There have been sporadic attempts to aid the plaintiff in his dif-
ficulty of proof in cases where multiple defendants were joined. As
to both negligence and warranty, the Kansas court279 has shifted the
burden of proof as to tracing the defect to the shoulders of the dealer
and the manufacturer; and Pennsylvania has done the same as to negli-
gence.2 0 The reasoning in these cases as to the meaning of "exclusive
control," where it is obviously not exclusive as to either party, is not
very convincing. They are quite evidently deliberate decisions of
policy, seeking to compensate the plaintiff first, and to leave the
defendants to fight out the question of responsibility among them-
selves. The same is to be said of a federal case out of Texas, 281 where
the burden was shifted to the maker of dynamite and the maker of the
cap attached to it, on the ground that they were cooperating to make
a combination product; and one from New York282 where the same
thing was done as to the maker of an altimeter and the manufacturer
of a plane in which it was installed.
So far as appears, this is not yet the law of California. Neither the
decision in Summers v. Tice,28 where the burden of proof as to causa-
tion was shifted to two defendants after both of them had been proved
to be negligent in shooting in the direction of the plaintiff, nor Ybarra
v. Spangard,284 where the burden was placed upon the multiple mem-
bers of the medical profession engaged in a surgical operation, on
the ground of the special responsibility assumed toward the uncon-
scious plaintiff, 28 5 is authority for anything more than the proposition
that there are negligence cases in which, for special reasons of policy,
two or more defendants may be required to exonerate themselves. In
the only products liability decision28 6 in California, involving a manu-
Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955); cf. Le Blanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346 Mass. 225,
191 N.E.2d 301 (1963) (automobile).
Particularly where the beverage foams or effervesces when it is opened. Heimsoth
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953); Rozumailski v.
Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 AUt. 700 (1929); Wichita Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Tyler, 288 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
2 79 Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953).
280 Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
281 Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960).
282 Becker v. American Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
28333 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 963 (1948).
28425 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). The outcome was judgment against all of
the defendants because they were unable, or unwilling, to explain the event. 93 Cal.
App. 2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949).
285 See Gobin v. Avenue Food Mart, 178 Cal. App. 2d 345, 2 Cal. Rptr. 822
(1960).
286 Gobin v. Avenue Food Mart, supra note 285.
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facturer, a wholesaler and a retailer, the court refused to apply the
Ybarra case on the ground that the special responsibility was lacking,
and left the burden of proof upon the plaintiff.
Also of obvious importance in this connection is the decision in the
Vandermark case,2 7 holding that the manufacturer cannot delegate
to the dealer the responsibility for the final "servicing" of his product.
Where this is applied, and any negligence of the dealer in such "ser-
vicing" is to be charged to the manufacturer, the plaintiff's proof
against the latter is obviously greatly facilitated. Except in this respect,
there appears to be nothing in any of the strict liability cases to indi-
cate that the problems of proof will be dealt with in any different
manner than in those involving only negligence.
287 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d
168 (1964). See text accompanying notes 174-178 supra.
